Since the first day of fighting, the United States had quietly supported Israel’s efforts to postpone a UN-declared cease-fire and thereby afford the IDF time to complete its victory in the south. In this way, America acknowledged the fact that Israel had done everything possible to avert a war with Nasser, and deserved the opportunity to remove the Egyptian threat forcibly. The eastern front, however, presented difficulties for Washington, which considered Hussein’s regime a cornerstone of Western influence in the region. Though it refrained from openly criticizing Israeli operations in the West Bank and Jerusalem, the Johnson administration secretly signaled its concern. Goldberg told Gideon Rafael, Israel’s ambassador to the UN, that the fall of Jordan would embroil Israel in “serious international complications.”⁶⁴

“Nu? So what do we say to Hussein?” Eshkol rhetorically asked a gathering of high-ranking ministers and advisers at dawn on June 7. Eban recommended that Israel accept the cease-fire in the hope that the Arabs would soon violate it. Dayan was against sending any reply. Eshkol listened to these suggestions, and then responded with a seemingly innocuous question: “Maybe we’ll just ask him who’s the boss in Jordan?”Eshkol had in fact made up his mind what to say to Hussein, and the message was daring. Israel would accept the cease-fire, but only if Hussein would reclaim command of his troops, guarantee a cease-fire, and agree to peace talks. “That’ll be the king’s death,” observed Yigal Allon, and indeed the chances of receiving a positive answer were slight. But if Hussein accepted Israel’s terms—for which the United States and Britain served as the intermediaries—Eshkol would have no choice but to refrain from entering the Old City.⁶⁵ The realization of a two-thousand-year-old dream would again be delayed indefinitely.

As in “the waiting period” preceding the war, Eshkol pursued a brinkmanship policy, exhausting all diplomatic options in order to mollify Washington and his opponents at home, all the while preparing to act militarily. Now, once again, his gamble paid off. Hussein never replied to Israel’s ultimatum. The Americans were again convinced that Israel had taken every reasonable step to prevent further bloodshed in Jerusalem, as were skeptics within Eshkol’s cabinet. At 9:30 a.m., the cabinet sanctioned the capture of the Old City. Israeli paratroopers rushed through the Lions’ Gate and soon after reported, “The Temple Mount is in our hands.”

Eshkol had played a decisive role in the Jerusalem campaign, navigating deftly around Dayan and other ministers opposed to entering the Old City, and correctly assessing Israel’s military and diplomatic latitude. He would fulfill a similar part in another struggle, no less crucial, over the Golan Heights.

Here, too, his background enabled him to understand the full implications of all sides of the issue. Eshkol the farmer sympathized with the northern settlements’ suffering under Syrian shellfire, and shared their aspiration to capture the Banias springs, a Jordan River source. Lior recalled how Eshkol “in every consultation and every discussion… would ask three or four times, ‘What’s happening up north? What about the Banias?’” His concern rose in tandem with Syria’s aggression. On the first day of the war, Syrian jets attacked targets in the Galilee, and Syrian gunners on the Golan rained thousands of shells onto Israeli civilians below. At dawn the following day, Syrian tanks and infantry launched an abortive assault on Kibbutz Dan.⁶⁶

Eskhol the statesman, however, recognized the dangers in responding to this aggression. In a cable dated June 7, Kosygin warned him: “Should Israel not follow the voice of reason, and should it not stop the bloodbath, it will bear the responsibility for the outbreak of war and for all its possible results.” The next morning, Chuvakhin threatened to sever relations with Israel—or worse. “If Israelis become drunk with success and pursue their aggression further, the future of this little country will be a very sad one indeed,” he said.⁶⁷ By attacking Syria, Israel risked clashing militarily with Moscow.

Eshkol’s consideration of the pros and cons of the situation was reflected in the cabinet’s deliberations, conducted on June 8. Once again it was Allon, Galili, and Begin pressing for immediate retribution against Syria, and Aran and Shapira opposing. Dayan objected as well, citing the threat of Soviet intervention. Eshkol could not ignore that threat, particularly in view of the recent communications from Moscow. “I know that this issue could entangle us with Russia,” Eshkol admitted to the ministers. He proposed that the cabinet resolve “to postpone for one to two days further decision regarding operations on the Syrian heights, and to order the chief of staff to submit an operations plan for approval by the Defense Committee.” During these two days, Eshkol cautioned, Israel should refrain from provoking the Syrians.⁶⁸

The statesman Eshkol had taken precedence over the farmer, but only temporarily. Syria’s shelling of the north intensified, and embattled residents of the area lobbied the government for help. “We’re being shelled nonstop!” one of them, Haim Ber, hollered into Eshkol’s telephone. “We demand that the government save us from this nightmare.” Next, in a meeting with Northern Commander Maj.-Gen. David Elazar, Eshkol heard that beyond Syria’s front-line defenses, the road to Damascus was open. “I can get up there today, capture positions and advance. Of course we’ll have casualties, but it won’t be a slaughter. We can do it.”

That night, Eshkol reconvened his senior ministers for the purpose of gaining approval for seizing at least part of the Golan. To this end, he invited Ya’akov Eshkoli, a representative of the Galilee settlements, to address the committee. “If the State of Israel is incapable of defending us, we should be told that outright… and evacuate our homes,” he insisted. Rabin confirmed that the army had the requisite forces to take the heights, and Allon asserted that he “prefer[red] the Syrian ridge without the Soviets to the Syrians remaining on that ridge and our retaining our ties with the Soviets.” These arguments succeeded in changing the mind of at least one minister, Zalman Aran, who observed that “for four thousand years we have spoken about the sacrifice of Isaac. In those settlements, men, women, and children are threatened with sacrifice. The situation is insufferable.”

Several ministers still objected to a counteroffensive, however, and none more strenuously than Dayan. He listed the reasons why Israel could not attack—Northern Command was undermanned, the air force exhausted, the Syrians determined to fight—and then landed a bombshell of his own. “I’d rather move the settlements ten or twenty miles from the Syrian artillery than get caught up in a third front leading to a clash with the Soviets…. Thousands of Arabs were relocated as a result of this war; we can relocate several dozen Israelis.” Eshkol bristled at the remark. “There could be no greater victory for the Syrians,” he retorted. He suggested that the cabinet authorize Dayan, Rabin, and him to approve an operation against Syria when they saw fit. “It’d be a pity if the Syrians got off scot-free.”⁶⁹

Eshkol went home that night still determined to advance on the Golan, but believing that action on the northern front would not take place for least another twenty-four hours. Just after midnight, however, Dayan received information that the fighting had finished on both the Egyptian and Jordanian fronts, that Syria was about to accept the cease-fire, and that enemy forces on the Golan had begun to crumble. Four hours later, feeling the opportunity slipping through Israel’s fingers, Dayan telephoned Elazar and gave him the order to attack.

Word of Dayan’s volte-face reached Eshkol indirectly, in a message sent by the Defense Ministry to Lior. Eshkol was furious at what he regarded as a violation of democratic norms. But now another dilemma confronted him: Either allow Dayan’s order to stand or forfeit the opportunity to settle accounts with Syria. “There’s no point in canceling the order now,” he concluded. “If he [Dayan] thinks he can do whatever he wants, let him do it.”⁷⁰ Thus, once Dayan had accepted Eshkol’s position in favor of capturing the Golan Heights, Eshkol decided that he would back his defense minister’s move against any opposition that it might meet.

Many ministers, however, were incensed by Dayan’s move. At 8:00 p.m. on June 9, as IDF troops completed a day of bitter combat and gained a substantial foothold on the heights, the ministers met in judgment on Dayan. “Why are we now going to violate the cease-fire in front of the whole world?” asked Shapira. Yisrael Barzilai, the health minister from Mapam, insisted that “this forum should have reconvened in the middle of the night and made a proper decision.” Compelled to justify his actions, Dayan implied that he had first consulted Eshkol, saying that “these factors enabled us to think that perhaps we had the ability to change the international border between us and Syria.”

If Eshkol had been a vengeful man, if he had placed personal pride over national interests, he might have isolated Dayan. Instead, he merely remarked, “I cannot say that I was asked,” and then continued: “But can we stop now that we are in the middle of the operation?” Eshkol provided the answer: “The Syrians cannot be allowed to parade in victory. Israel cannot have overturned all the Arab countries and not Syria.” Persuaded by Eshkol’s reasoning, the ministers resolved to allow the campaign to continue until the following morning. “If the people at the front feel they can finish the task tonight and tomorrow—let them,” said Eshkol. “In any case we will be condemned in the UN.”⁷¹