On the other hand, Israeli ambassador Avraham Harman reported from Washington that the administration still opposed any resort to force, and had invited Egyptian Vice President Zakhariyya Muhieddin for talks on resolving the crisis. In a further effort to clarify America’s position, Eshkol ordered IDF intelligence to monitor the American media for signs of support for pre-emption. “What do we have to do so that they [the Americans] won’t say, ‘But you promised to wait’?” he asked Dayan on June 2. The answer would come that night as both Harman and Amit returned to Jerusalem.⁵⁴

Lior, who recorded the meeting, recalled the tension was “unbearable” as, at midnight, Amit and Harman entered. Their message was uniform: The United States could not mount the convoy operation, nor would it cooperate with Israel militarily. But, Amit added, “It is my impression that the Americans will give their blessing to any action that succeeds in sticking it to Nasser.”⁵⁵

Even so, Eshkol was not yet convinced that Israel had secured all the political advantages of waiting. At a joint meeting of government ministers and the general staff the following morning, June 3, he again counseled restraint. The government remained divided, with Allon and Galili again leading the faction in favor of attacking, and Shapira and Aran heading the opposition. Members of the general staff were also present, and after soberly describing their battle plans, they assailed the government’s inaction. “Nasser is getting stronger, and we just sit there and do nothing,” Yoffe protested. Maj.-Gen. Matti Peled followed, charging that “The enemy is digging in while our economy weakens, and all for a purpose that no one has yet explained.” As Lior recalled it, the officers staged a “war of attrition” against the government: “They went on pounding the ministers’ heads…[trying] to bring them to their knees.”

Eshkol, however, was undeterred. “We will still need Johnson’s help and support,” he insisted. “I hope we won’t need it during the fighting, but we shall certainly need it if we are victorious, in order to protect our gains. I want to make it clear to the president, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that we have not misled him; that we’ve given the necessary time for any political action designed to prevent the war. Two days more or less will not sway the outcome.” After further debate, Eshkol endorsed a proposal, put forth by Dayan, that the government reconvene in twenty-four hours to make a final decision.⁵⁶

Those hours only complicated Israel’s position, seemingly limiting its ability to strike first. First came a personal letter to Eshkol from Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, warning that “If the Israeli government insists on taking upon itself the responsibility for the outbreak of armed confrontation, then it will pay the full price of such an action.” Next, France announced that it would suspend all arms shipments to the Middle East.⁵⁷ Finally, just as the government was reconvening, another cable arrived from Johnson. The contents were again ambiguous: A reaffirmation of America’s commitment to Israel’s security, coupled with a reiteration of the declaration that “Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go it alone.” The president concluded, “I must emphasize the necessity for Israel not to make itself responsible for the initiation of hostilities.… We cannot imagine that it will make this decision.”⁵⁸

But events along Israel’s borders made it impossible to continue waiting, as Yariv told the cabinet of the thousands of troops, tanks, and planes now amassed on Israel’s borders. Foreign Minister Eban, who had been among those most opposed to a pre-emptive strike, admitted that there was no longer hope of a diplomatic solution and that military action was now necessary. Haim Moshe Shapira continued to raise objections, quoting Ben-Gurion to the effect that Israel could never go to war without an ally among the great powers. Yet this argument had lost its hold on his colleagues, and Dayan snapped: “Then let Ben-Gurion go and find us an ally. I’m not sure we’ll still be alive.” Yigal Allon, counseling against further delays, predicted that “The world will condemn us, but we will survive.”

Finally, Eshkol spoke. For over two weeks he had played for time, resisted immense pressures, suffered unremitting scorn. Yet now he could unreservedly say that Israel had explored every option to the fullest, and that it had no choice but to go to war. That knowledge had created a consensus within the government supporting action, and would have a tremendous impact on American leaders who would soon have to decide whether or not to oppose Israel’s military efforts. Eshkol might have summarized the painful but necessary process endured by Israel, and praised his own temperance. Instead, he said simply, “I’m convinced that today we must give the order to the IDF to choose the time and manner in which to act.”⁵⁹

The discussion, one of the most momentous in Israel’s history, was over. A proposal was presented—“It is therefore decided to launch a military strike aimed at liberating Israel from encirclement and preventing the impending assault by the united Arab armies”—and put to a vote. Twelve ministers voted in favor, and only two, from the left-wing Mapam party, opposed it. These two subsequently changed their positions, providing Eshkol with the unity he had striven for, his prerequisite for embarking on war.⁶⁰

 

The war commenced at 7:30 a.m. the next morning, June 5, when Israeli planes destroyed much of Egypt’s air force on the ground. Thereafter, Israeli tanks and infantry also broke through Egyptian defenses in Sinai and sowed panic in the ranks of the Egyptian army. Eshkol’s efforts to modernize the army and promote its most talented commanders, and his commitment to expanding Israel’s intelligence capabilities, had all proved invaluable. Moreover, lulled into complacency by the lengthy “waiting period,” Arab military leaders had let down their guard. The IDF, by contrast, had achieved a maximum state of readiness. “The army was bolted and locked,” recalled Shlomo Merom, a senior intelligence officer. “We had only to pull the trigger.”⁶¹ Though desperate battles were yet to be fought, the outcome of the war was largely determined in its opening hours.

Eshkol spent those hours writing letters to Western leaders asking for their support in the conflict, and directing diplomatic efforts to delay UN attempts to stem the Israeli advance.⁶² Fully engaged on the diplomatic front, Eshkol left the tactical management of the war largely to Rabin and Dayan. Yet there were two exceptions to this rule, both of them critical to Israel’s future, both demanding Eshkol’s singular brand of leadership.

The first exception was Jerusalem. With the outbreak of fighting, Eshkol secretly warned Hussein not to join the war. Desperate to avoid opening a second front, the Israelis remained passive when Jordan’s guns started bombarding western Jerusalem, while Jordanian jets strafed civilian targets in Netanya and the southern Galilee. But then the Jordanians began shelling Israeli airfields and advancing on the ground in Jerusalem. Eshkol supported the decision to send Israeli forces into the West Bank to silence the artillery, but when Begin and Allon proposed that the IDF capture eastern Jerusalem, the prime minister balked. Sis agedank, Eshkol replied sarcastically in Yiddish, slapping a hand to his forehead—“There’s an idea.”

As a Jew from an observant background, and a former Hagana official who remembered the failed efforts to capture the Old City in 1948, Eshkol wanted nothing more than to reunify Jerusalem. As a statesman, however, he feared the censure Israel might incur from Western countries if it occupied Christian holy places. “We have to weigh the diplomatic ramifications of conquering the Old City,” he told a select group of ministers meeting on the first night of the war. “Even if we take the West Bank and the Old City, we will eventually be forced to leave them.” The government was again split between those members pressing for immediate action and those resisting it, among them Dayan, who warned of impairing Israel’s relations with Christian countries and the Vatican. Eshkol once more advised patience. He drafted a compromise formula reflecting a consensus of opinion, which was unanimously accepted by the cabinet: “In view of the situation created in Jerusalem by the Jordanian bombardment, and after warnings were sent to Hussein, an opportunity has perhaps been created to capture the Old City.”⁶³

The situation in Jerusalem changed radically over the next day, however, as Israeli forces succeeded in routing the Jordanians and virtually encircling the Old City. With the army within reach of the Temple Mount, Judaism’s holiest site, could the government still justify ordering it to halt? Eshkol no longer thought so. He was also deeply angered and disappointed by Hussein, who, after first calling on his troops to cease fire, was again exhorting them to battle. Eshkol now proposed that Israel capture the Old City and declare its respect for all religious shrines. But Dayan continued to oppose the move—and so, now, did the Americans.