Eshkol had once again brought a divided government to agreement at a critical time. But more formidable obstacles lay ahead. The Kremlin now pledged to “render assistance” to the Syrians “in order to repel the [Israeli] aggression and defend their national independence.” The United States, which had rushed warships into the eastern Mediterranean to discourage Soviet intervention, nevertheless began to express disapproval of Israel’s action. Secretary of State Dean Rusk wrote to Eshkol that he was “deeply disturbed” by the Golan assault, while at the UN, Goldberg took Rafael aside and told him, “The United States government does not want the war to end as the result of a Soviet ultimatum. This would be disastrous for the future not only of Israel, but of us all.” America’s ability to deter Soviet intervention was undermined, Washington warned, by Israeli violations of the cease-fire.⁷²

The gravity of these messages was not lost on Eshkol. Now, in addition to resistance within the cabinet, he had also to overcome Washington’s objections and, possibly, armed interference from Moscow. The situation worsened at 10:00 a.m. on June 10, when Chuvakhin stormed into Israel’s Foreign Ministry and announced the severance of Moscow’s diplomatic relations with Israel. Nine other Communist bloc countries quickly followed suit. The move was accompanied by yet another threat from Kosygin: “If Israel does not cease its action immediately, the USSR, together with other peace-loving nations, will take sanctions, with all the implications thereof.”⁷³

To enable the IDF to complete the capture of the Golan, Eshkol urged that it do its work more swiftly. “We must finish quickly,” Eshkol implored Dayan and Elazar when he met them that morning. “We’re under heavy pressure from the UN.” At the same time, however, he employed a brinkmanship strategy, and did not call off the IDF until it had completed the full conquest of the heights at 6:00 p.m. With the cease-fire in place, the Americans undertook to coordinate their postwar policy with Israel while the Soviet threat evaporated. The Six Day War, as it came to be known in Israel and most of the world, was over.⁷⁴

 

In contrast to Moshe Dayan and Yitzhak Rabin, who became cultural icons after June 1967, Levi Eshkol was never lionized. Nonetheless, with the perspective of three and a half decades, it is now possible to recognize his crucial contributions to victory.

Eshkol built the army that won the war, strengthened Israel’s intelligence capabilities, and retained the services of its most talented generals. Despite the extreme tensions of “the waiting period,” he preserved and even expanded his coalition, all the while working patiently to reach a consensus among his diversely minded ministers. Most importantly, by thoroughly exploring all diplomatic alternatives, Eshkol gained sympathy abroad and particularly in the United States. Once war broke out, the Johnson administration cooperated with Israel in postponing a UN cease-fire, and effectively checked Soviet attempts to intervene. Later, in November 1967, the U.S. served as the prime architect of UN Resolution 242, which stipulated that Israel would not have to withdraw from captured territories without an Arab commitment to peace. Through Eshkol’s efforts, a repeat of Israel’s 1956 trauma was averted.

Eshkol’s policies also had a pivotal impact on the course of the war. Arab leaders were deceived into believing that Israel would never attack, leaving their own armies exposed to a surprise assault. The IDF, meanwhile, completed its mobilization, practiced offensives, and primed itself for battle. “We were all a bunch of war-horses who never understood Eshkol,” Rehavam Ze’evi, the IDF deputy chief of operations during the war, remembered. “In retrospect, I can see that he was right. Thanks to his wisdom, the army was totally trained for war. That was Eshkol’s blessing. He proved himself.”⁷⁵

Eshkol also deserves credit for his role in the historic battles for Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. In both cases, he acted in the same fashion that he had during “the waiting period,” exploring diplomatic alternatives while readying the army to act, building a consensus before resorting, finally, to force. And once force was employed, Eshkol resisted tremendous pressure in order to ensure that the army had time to attain its objectives.

For Eshkol, Israel’s objectives in the Six Day War were clear. Thus, during a visit to Johnson’s Texas ranch in January 1968, he told the president:

I have no sense of boastful triumph, nor have I entered the struggle for peace in the role of victor. My feeling is one of relief that we were saved from disaster in June, and for this I thank God. All my thoughts now are turned toward achieving peace with our neighbors—a peace of honor between equals.⁷⁶

Eshkol was a man not only of war but ultimately of peace, a democrat and a patriot. He was all of these things, but was he a leader? Certainly, he was not a leader in the Weberian sense, charismatic and articulate, like Ben-Gurion or Begin. Eshkol, by contrast, led less by allure and inspiration than by candor and common sense, by patience and coalition-building. Steeped in Jewish values and culture, he was moreover a distinctly Jewish leader, exhibiting qualities—wisdom, humility, forbearance—that Judaism traditionally associates with effective leadership.⁷⁷ Convinced of the soundness of his policies, Eshkol was able to withstand overwhelming opposition, to temporize and strike compromises, while never losing sight of his objective. He knew when to hold tight and when to give in, to go to the brink but not beyond it. If triumph over adversity is the real test of leadership, then Eshkol truly excelled.

Many leaders, scorned by their contemporaries, are appreciated only in retrospect, and Eshkol was no exception. A year after his meeting with Johnson, Levi Eshkol was dead, the victim of heart failure caused—Lior believed—by the stresses of the Six Day War. Stunned, the same newspapers that once excoriated him suddenly gushed with his praise. Ha’aretz lauded his “ability to run the state with a staff of refinement rather than the spear of wrath,” and his “roots as a Jew, an Israeli, and a man experienced in the ways of life far beyond politics.” Wrote Ma’ariv, “Perhaps only Eshkol, whose personality combined audacity, obstinacy, and weakness, could have weathered the most serious crisis Israel has ever faced.”⁷⁸

Since then, the name of Eshkol has been perpetuated in a number of projects associated with his life—in Eshkol Lake (the national water carrier’s largest reservoir), in the Eshkol Agricultural Belt in southern Israel, and in the Ramat Eshkol neighborhood of Jerusalem. Yet the legacy of the man who contributed inestimably to the country’s birth, growth, and security remains unfamiliar to many Israelis, and especially those born after his death.

Not for long, however, for with declassification of documents from 1967, Eshkol’s accomplishments can at last be revealed and appreciated. Contrary to his previous image as vacillating and inconsequential, Eshkol can now be seen as consistent throughout, and integral to Israel’s victory in the Six Day War. His unique combination of patience, foresight, and strength made him the right leader to guide Israel successfully through one of the most tumultuous episodes in its history. Today, as the country confronts challenges no less daunting, the record of that leadership is especially pertinent.

Michael B. Oren is ’s Ambassador to the . He was formerly a Distinguished Fellow at the in Jerusalem, an academic and research institute, and a contributing editor of AZURE. 

 

1. Parts of this article have been adapted from my book Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford, 2002).

2. There is one non-academic biography of Eshkol in English, and one in Hebrew: Terence Prittie, Eshkol: The Man and the Nation (New York: Pitman, 1969); and Yosef Shapira, Levi Eshkol (Ramat Gan: Masada, 1969). [Hebrew] One particularly noteworthy essay providing a reassessment of Eshkol’s leadership is Yehiam Weitz, “‘The Man of Consensus’: Levi Eshkol and His Era,” in Tzvi Tzameret and Chana Yablonka, eds., The Second Decade: 1958-1968 (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 2000), pp. 167-192. [Hebrew]

3. Eyal Naveh, The Twentieth Century: On the Brink of Tomorrow (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books, 1999) [Hebrew]; Eliezer Dumka, The World and the Jews in Recent Generations (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar, 1998). [Hebrew]

4. Robert Slater, Rabin of Israel, A Biography (London: Robson, 1993), p. 150.

5. Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (Berkeley: University of California, 1996), pp. 93-94.

6. Levi Eshkol website, research.haifa.ac.il/~eshkol/roots.html.

7. Eshkol website, research.haifa.ac.il/~eshkol.

8. S.N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1970), pp. 26-33. [Hebrew] General information on Eshkol’s early years and achievements can be found at the following websites: www.us-israel.org/jsource/biography/eshkol.html; www.jajz-ed.org.il/100/people/bios/eshkol.html; www.jafi.org.il/treasurer/bios/eshkol.htm; and www.israel.org/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00fr0.

9. Rabin quote from Rabin, Memoirs, p. 61; Ezer Weizman, On Eagles’ Wings: The Personal Story of the Leading Commander of the Israeli Air Force (New York: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 190-191. For further comments on Eshkol’s personality, see Prittie, Eshkol, pp. 105, 183; Eitan Haber, Today War Will Break Out (Tel Aviv: Yedi’ot Aharonot, 1987), pp. 140-142 [Hebrew]; National Archives of Canada (hereafter “NAC”), RG 25, Box 10082: 20-ISR-9: Visit of Prime Minister Eshkol to Canada, January 15-26, 1968; Eliav quote from the Eshkol website, research.haifa.ac.il/~eshkol/lova.html.

10. On the abortive spy operation in Egypt, see Michael B. Oren, The Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War: Egypt, Israel, and the Great Powers, 1952-1956 (London: Frank Cass, 1992), pp. 52-54, 106-108.

11. Eshkol initially held Ben-Gurion’s assumption as well, viewing his government as a caretaker pending Ben-Gurion’s return. But a generation of younger leaders saw in Eshkol the opportunity to break Ben-Gurion’s monopoly over Mapai politics, and determined to keep him in the Prime Minister’s Office. As Eshkol began to register important political achievements both within Israel and abroad, he came to share their view.

12. Sarid quote from Eshkol website, research.haifa.ac.il/~eshkol/sarid.html. Regarding Eshkol’s conciliatory policy towards the opposition, see Weitz, “Man of Consensus,” p. 179.

13. Eshkol quote from www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0dxm0. Eshkol’s peace plan is posted on www.us-israel.org/jsource/Peace/eshpeace.html.

14. The Johnson-Eshkol exchange is reproduced in The Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968; Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-1967 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2000), vol. xviii, pp. 152-155. See also I.L. Kenen, Israel’s Defense Line: Her Friends and Foes in Washington (Buffalo: Prometheus, 1981), p. 173; and United States National Archives (hereafter “USNA”), Middle East Crisis Files, 1967, Lot File 68D135, Box 1: United States Statements on Israel: Johnson Statements, June 1, 1964.

15. The impact of the Skyhawk sale was mainly symbolic at first; the planes were delivered only in December 1967, six months after the Six Day War.

16. On Eshkol’s warnings, see Prittie, Eshkol, pp. 211, 244; and Weitz, “Man of Consensus,” pp. 186-187. Eshkol quotes from Moshe A. Gilboa, Six Years, Six Days: The Origins and Events of the Six Day War (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1969), pp. 34, 36. [Hebrew] Eshkol quote from Haber, Today, p. 54.

17. Eshkol’s reluctance to repeat that trauma led him to rebuke Rabin when the latter publicly pledged to repay Damascus for its aggression. Haber, Today,pp. 54, 122, 133-134, 146-147; Michael Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973 (Berkeley: University of California, 1980), p. 36; Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library (hereafter “LBJ”), National Security Files, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Box 17: Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, May 12, 1967; Gilboa, Six Years, Six Days, pp. 98-101; Middle East Record, iii (1967), p. 187; Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1993), pp. 105, 15-18; Richard B. Parker, The Six Day War: A Retrospective (Jacksonville: University Press of Florida, 1996), pp. 263, 31-32, 69; Weizman, On Eagles’ Wings, p. 208.

18. Interview with Miriam Eshkol, August 30, 1999. See also George W. Gawrych, The Albatross of Decisive Victory: War and Policy Between Egypt and Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 2000), p. 3.

19. LBJ, National Security Files, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Box 17: Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, May 12, 1967; Public Record Office (hereafter “PRO”), FCO 17/577, Israel—Defense: Report of Defense Attache, November 16, 1966; Haber, Today,pp. 141, 145-147 (Eshkol quote); Gilboa, Six Years, Six Days, pp. 98-101; Parker, Miscalculation, pp. 15-18; Parker, Six Day War, pp. 31-32, 69; Eyal Sisser, “Between Israel and Syria: The Six Day War and Afterward,” Iyunim Bitkumat Yisrael 8 (1998), p. 220.

20. United Nations Archive (hereafter “UN”), DAG 13/3.4.0, Box 84: hjkimac, El-Farra to Secretary General, February 6, 1967; Bull to Sasson, May 15, 1967; LBJ, National Security Files, Middle East, Israel Boxes 140, 141: Katzenbach to President, May 2, 1967; NAC, RG 25, Box 10050: Political Affairs—Canada’s Foreign Policy Trends and Relations—Israel: Israel’s Independence Day Parade, May 15, 1967; Israel State Archives (hereafter “ISA”), 3977/22 Diplomatic Relations with the United States: Bitan to Evron, April 16, 1967; Israel Labor Party Archives (hereafter “ILP”), Party Secretariat Protocols, 2/24/66/88: December 15, 1966. Ben-Gurion quote from Davar, May 9, 1967.

21. ISA, 4078/4 Foreign Ministry Files, Contacts with the United States on the Entry of Egyptian Forces to Sinai: Harman Conversation with Rostow, May 15, 1967; 3977/20 Foreign Ministry Files, Relations with the United States: Eban to Washington, London, Paris, May 15, 1967; LBJ, National Security Files, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Box 17: Department of State to Cairo, May 15, 1967; Shlomo Nakdimon, Toward H-Hour (Tel Aviv: Ramdor, 1968), pp. 17-18 [Hebrew]; Gideon Rafael, Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israeli Foreign Policy (New York: Stein and Day, 1981), pp. 136-137.

22. ISA, 6444/4 North America, Telegrams: Foreign Ministry to Embassies, May 19, 1967; 7920/1 Levi Eshkol Papers, Diplomatic Telegrams: Eban to Rafael, May 17, 1967; LBJ, National Security Files, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Box 17: Department of State to Cairo, May 15, 1967; History of the Middle East Conflict, Box 20: United States Policy and Diplomacy in the Middle East Crisis, May 15-June 10, 1967, pp. 11-12. Eshkol quote from interview with Miriam Eshkol, August 30, 1999; Parker, Six Day War, p. 137; Haber, Today, pp. 147-150; Matityahu Mayzel, The Golan Heights Campaign: June 1967 (Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 2001), pp. 99-103 [Hebrew]; Abraham Rabinovich, The Battle for Jerusalem, June 5-7, 1967 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1972), p. 5; Meir Amit, Head to Head: A Personal View of Great Events and Clandestine Operations (Or Yehuda: Hed Artzi, 1999), pp. 226-227. [Hebrew]

23. ISA, 4078/8 U.S. Reactions to the Closing of the Straits, Eban to Harman, May 16, 1967; Israel Defense Forces Archive (hereafter “IDF”), 710/70 general staff Discussion: May 17, 1967; Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 239; Haber, Today,pp.150-151; U Thant, View from the UN (New York: Doubleday, 1978), p. 219; Rabin, Memoirs, pp. 68-70; Nasser quote from BBC Daily Report, Middle East, Africa, and Western Europe, ME/2467/A/2. Syrian quote from Menahem Mansoor, Arab World: Political and Diplomatic History, 1900-1967: A Chronological Study (NCR, Microcard Editors), entry for May 16, 1967.

24. LBJ, National Security Files, History of the Middle East Conflict, Box 20: United States Policy and Diplomacy in the Middle East Crisis, May 15-June 10, 1967, pp. 12-14; ISA, 6444/4 North America, Telegrams: Foreign Ministry to Embassies, May 19, 1967; 7920/1 Levi Eshkol Papers, Diplomatic Telegrams: Eban to Rafael, May 17, 1967; IDF, 710/70 general staff Discussion: May 17, 1967; UN, S 0316-Box 9, File 2: unef Withdrawals, Exchange with UAR, Aide-Memoire, U Thant to UAR, May 17, 1967; Parker, Miscalculation, p. 68; Indar Jit Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force Leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967 (London: Frank Cass, 1980), p. 16.

25. ISA, 7920/4 Levi Eshkol Papers, Prime Minister’s Reports and Surveys: Eshkol’s Reports to Ministerial Defense Committee, May 18, 1967; Haber, Today, p. 153; Rabin, Memoirs, pp. 70-71; David Kimche and Dan Bawley, The Sandstorm: The Arab-Israeli War of June 1967: Prelude and Aftermath (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968), p. 136.

26. The White House also turned down Israel’s requests for expediting the delivery of tanks and jets already purchased by Israel. ISA, 4087/6 Foreign Ministry Files, Emergency Appeal: Eshkol to Harman, May 17, 1967; Abba Eban, Personal Witness: Israel Through My Eyes (New York: Putnam, 1992), pp. 36-38; Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), p. 290; William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1993), p. 28.

27. ISA, 4084/2 Foreign Ministry Files, Relations with France: Eshkol to de Gaulle, May 19, 1967; 4080/5 Contacts with Great Britain: London to Foreign Ministry, May 18, 1967; 4078/4 Foreign Ministry Files, Contacts with the United States on the Entry of Egyptian Forces into Sinai: Eshkol to Johnson, May 18, 1967; LBJ, National Security Files, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Box 17: Summary of Arab-Israel Developments, Night of May 19-20, 1967; Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, May 21, 1967.

28. ISA, 7920/2 Levi Eshkol Papers, Diplomatic Telegrams, ussr: Conversation with the Soviet Ambassador, May 19, 1967; LBJ, National Security Files, History of the Middle East Conflict, Box 20: United States Policy and Diplomacy in the Middle East Crisis, May 15-June 10, 1967, p. 13 (Johnson letter to Eshkol); PRO, prem 13 1617: The Middle East Crisis: Record of Conversation Between the Foreign Secretary and the Israeli Ambassador, May 19, 1967; Haber, Today, p. 154; Avigdor Dagan, Moscow and Jerusalem: Twenty Years of Relations Between Israel and the Soviet Union (London: Abelard-Schuman, 1970), pp. 211-212.

29. IDF, 710/70 general staff Discussion: May 19, 1967; ISA, 4088/11 The Entry into Sinai of Egyptian Troops and the Closure of the Tiran Straits, Report of Research Branch, May 22, 1967. Egyptian quote from BBC Daily Report, Middle East, Africa, and Western Europe, no. A-1g; Mansoor, Arab World, entries for May 18, 19, 20, 21, 1967. Syrian quote from Al-Bath, May 18, 1967.

30. ISA, 6444/5 North America, Telegrams: Foreign Ministry to Embassies, May 31, 1967; Ben-Gurion Archives (hereafter “BGA”), Diary, Entry for May 22, 1967; LBJ, National Security Files, History of the Middle East Conflict, Box 20: United States Policy and Diplomacy in the Middle East Crisis, May 15-June 10, 1967, pp. 27-28, 43-44; Rabin, Memoirs, pp. 72-83; Slater, Rabin of Israel, pp.126-127; Dan Kurzman, Soldier of Peace: The Life of Yitzhak Rabin (New York: HarperCollins, 1998), pp. 208-209; Haber, Today, pp. 155, 161-162 (Eshkol cabinet quotes), 188 (Rabin quote). Eshkol Knesset quote from Henry M. Christman, ed., The State Papers of Levi Eshkol (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), p. 88.

31. ISA, 7919/1 Levi Eshkol Files, Diplomatic Telegrams, U.S.A.: Harman to Eban, May 22, 1967; Haber, Today, pp. 159, 166-169; Rabin, Memoirs, p. 77 (Yariv quote); Haber, Today, p. 164 (Weizman quote).

32. Eban, Personal Witness, pp. 363-370; Moshe Raviv, Israel at Fifty: Five Decades of the Struggle for Peace (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998), pp. 92-93; interview with Zerah Warhaftig, February 23, 1999. See also Brecher, Decisions in Crisis, p. 120; Aryeh Brown, Personal Stamp: Moshe Dayan and the Six Day War (Tel Aviv: Yedi’ot Aharonot, 1997), pp. 20-23. [Hebrew]

33. ISA, 5937/30 Secret Memoranda Prior to the Six Day War: Paris to Foreign Ministry, Protocol of Eban Meeting with President de Gaulle, May 25, 1967; 7920/1 Levi Eshkol Papers, Diplomatic Telegrams: The Wilson-Eban Conversation, May 24, 1967; LBJ, National Security Files, History of the Middle East Conflict, Box 20: United States Policy and Diplomacy in the Middle East Crisis, May 15-June 10, 1967, pp. 39-40; PRO, CAB 128/42 31st Conclusions: May 24, 1967; prem 13 1617: The Middle East Crisis, May 23, 1967; Eban, Personal Witness,pp.372-377;Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Ruler, 1945-1970 (New York: Norton, 1992), p. 439; Maurice Couve de Murville, Foreign Policy 1958-1969 (Paris: Plon, 1971), p. 469 [French]; Harold Wilson, The Chariot of Israel: Britain, America, and the State of Israel (New York: Norton, 1981), pp. 333-334; Haber, Today, pp. 171-175; Gilboa, Six Years, Six Days, p. 129; Shlomo Gazit, Innocents Entrapped: Thirty Years of Israeli Policy in the Territories (Tel Aviv: Zemora Bitan, 1999), p. 28. [Hebrew]

34. Haber, Today, p. 187; Ami Gluska, The Dispute Between Israel’s Army Command and the Political Leadership During the “Waiting Period” of May-June 1967 (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, 2001), pp.17-22.

35. Haber, Today, pp. 187-188; Gluska, Dispute, pp. 17-22.

36. Haber, Today, pp. 187-188; Gluska, Dispute, pp.17-22.

37. LBJ, National Security Files, Memos to President (W. Rostow), Box 16: Rusk to Cairo and Tel Aviv, May 25, 1967; History of the Middle East Conflict, Box 20: United States Policy and Diplomacy in the Middle East Crisis, May 15-June 10, 1967, pp. 30-33, 56-57; ISA, 5937/30 Secret Memoranda Prior to the Six-Day War: Evron to Ministry, Report on the 1.5-Hour Meeting Between Foreign Minister Eban and President Johnson at the White House, May 26, 1967; 7919/1 Levi Eshkol Files, Diplomatic Telegrams, U.S.A.: Eban to Eshkol, May 26, 1967; Muhammad Hassanayn Heikal, 1967: The Explosion (Cairo: Marcaz al-Ahram, 1990), pp. 564-565 [Arabic]; interview with Robert McNamara, February 16, 2000; Eban, Personal Witness, pp. 386-394; Raviv, Israel at Fifty, pp. 100-101; Quandt, Peace Process, p. 514 n. 53; Walt Whitman Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History (New York: Macmillan, 1972), p. 417.

38. ISA, 7920/4 Levi Eshkol Papers, Prime Minister’s Reports and Surveys, Meeting of the Cabinet, May 27, 1967; 7920/2 Diplomatic Telegrams, ussr: Allon to Eban, May 21, 1967; 3977/22 Foreign Ministry Files, Relations with the United States: Foreign Ministry to Embassies, May 27, 1967; 5937/30 Secret Memoranda Prior to the Six Day War: Evron to Foreign Ministry, May 27, 1967; Haber, Today, p.192; Nakdimon, Toward H-Hour, p. 130; Rabin, Memoirs, pp. 89-90; Eban, Personal Witness, pp. 396-399; Raviv, Israel at Fifty, pp. 102-103; MPA, Party Secretariat Protocols, 2/24/66/88: June 1, 1967. See also Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale, 1975), p. 400; Brecher, Decisions in Crisis, p. 146; Gluska, Dispute, pp.17-22.

39. ISA, 3977/22 Foreign Ministry Files, Relations with the United States: Foreign Ministry to Embassies, May 27, 1967; 5937/30 Secret Memoranda Prior to the Six Day War: Evron to Foreign Ministry, May 27, 1967; LBJ, National Security Files, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Box 17: Johnson to Eshkol, May 27, 1967, Johnson to Barbour, May 27, 1967.

40. Rabin, Memoirs, pp. 90-91.

41. ISA, 7920/4 Levi Eshkol Papers, Prime Minister’s Reports and Surveys, Meeting of the Cabinet, May 27, 1967; Haber, Today,p.192; Rabin, Memoirs, pp. 89-90; Eban, Personal Witness, pp. 396-399; Raviv, Israel at Fifty, pp. 102-103; USNA, POL ARAB-ISR, Tel Aviv Files, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, May 28, 1967; ILP, Party Secretariat Protocols, 2/24/66/88: June 1, 1967. See also Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, p. 400; Brecher, Decisions in Crisis, p. 146.

42. IDF,1977/1786 The Regular Paratrooper Brigade in the Six Day War, Commander 35th Brigade, p. 626; interview with Miriam Eshkol; Haber, Today, pp.194-196; Ze’ev Schiff, “The Hourglass,” Ha’aretz, May 29, 1967, p. 2.

43. Ariel Sharon, Warrior (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 181-184; Haber, Today,pp.194-198;Brown, Personal Stamp,pp.25-26; Gluska, Dispute, pp.23-27; Rabin, Memoirs,pp.92-94; Weizman, On Eagles’ Wings, pp.214-216; interview with Yeshayahu Gavish, December 7, 1999; interview with Rehavam Ze’evi, September 9, 2001.

44. Gluska, Dispute, pp. 34-36.

45. BGA, Diary, Entries for May 28, 1967; “A National Leadership Is Needed,” Ha’aretz, May 29, 1967, p. 2; Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1995), pp.90-93; Haber, Today, pp.182, 200-201; ILP, 2/24/66/88: Meeting of the Executive Committee, June 1, 1967; Gluska, Dispute, pp. 29-33; Rabin, Memoirs, p. 94; Golda Meir, My Life (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1975), pp. 362-363; Amos Perlmutter, The Life and Times of Menachem Begin (New York: Doubleday, 1987), p. 283; Gawrych, Albatross of Decisive Victory, p. 19; Nakdimon, Toward H-Hour, pp. 61-81, 102; Brown, Personal Stamp,pp.29-30; Shabtai Teveth, Moshe Dayan: A Biography (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1973), pp. 564-565. [Hebrew] Eshkol quote from Zaki Shalom and S. Ilan Troen, “Ben-Gurion’s Diary for the 1967 Six-Day War: An Introduction,” Israel Studies 4:2 (Fall 1999), p. 197.

46. On Hussein’s visit to Cairo, see Heikal, Explosion, pp. 694-695; USNA, pol arab-isr, Box 9: Amman to Secretary of State, May 31, 1967; Samir A. Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1987), pp. 108-110; Hussein, King of Jordan, My “War” with Israel, trans. June P. Wilson and Walter B. Michaels (New York: Morrow, 1969), pp. 43-48; Efraim Kamm, Hussein Wages War: The Six Day War from the Jordanian Perspective (Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 1974), p.283 [Hebrew]; Mohamad Ibrahim Faddah, The Middle East in Transition: A Study of Jordan’s Foreign Policy (New York: Asia, 1974), p. 75. Figures on the Arab military from Rabin, Memoirs, p. 100; Aref quote from BBC Daily Report, Middle East, Africa, and Western Europe, no. 1 bg.

47. ISA, 4086/8 Foreign Ministry Files, Red Cross: Foreign Ministry to the Hague, May 30, 1967; 4087/1 Egyptian Army Entry into Sinai and Closure of the Tiran Straits: Copenhagen to Foreign Ministry, June 3, 1967; 4087/6 Emergency Appeal: Rothschild to Sapir, May 28, 1967; 7920/3 Levi Eshkol Papers, Diplomatic Telegrams, General: Bonn to Foreign Ministry, June 1, 1967; PRO, prem 13 1619: The Middle East Crisis: Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, June 4, 1967.

48. Avraham Rabinovich, “The War That Nobody Wanted,” The Jerusalem Post Magazine, June 13, 1997, p. 12; Prittie, Eshkol, pp. 101-102; Haber, Today, pp.183, 203, 209; Weizman, On Eagles’ Wings, pp. 217-218; Brown, Personal Stamp, pp. 26-27.

49. Teveth, Moshe Dayan, pp. 570-571; Rabin, Memoirs, p. 94; Haber, Today, pp.200, 220; Mayzel, Golan Heights Campaign, pp. 241-243; MosheDayan, Story of My Life (London: Sphere, 1976), pp. 340-341; Michael Shashar, Conversations with Rehavam “Ghandi” Ze’evi (Tel Aviv: Yedi’ot Aharonot, 1992), p. 165. [Hebrew]

50. LBJ, National Security Files, History of the Middle East Conflict, Box 20: United States Policy and Diplomacy in the Middle East Crisis, May 15-June 10, 1967, pp. 69-70, 81-88. Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 294; Brown, Personal Stamp, pp. 28-29, 43-44; Haber, Today, pp. 203, 249; Dayan, My Life, pp. 338-339.

51. LBJ, National Security Files, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Box 18: W. Rostow to President, June 2, 1967; NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Box 17: The President in the Middle East Crisis, December 19, 1968; USNA, Middle East Crisis Files, 1967, Box 17: Ninth Control Group Meeting, June 3, 1967; ISA, 7919/1 Levi Eshkol Files, Diplomatic Telegrams: Evron to Bitan, May 29, 1967; PRO, FO 17/489, Israel—Political Affairs: Foreign Ministry to Washington, June 2, 1967; interview with Avraham Liff, September 13, 1999; interview with Shlomo Merom, December 7, 1999; Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 46-47.

52. Interview with Meir Amit, February 9, 1999; McNamara quote from Amit’s Report on Visit to the United States, June 4, 1967, access to which was furnished during the interview; ISA, 6444/5 North America, Telegrams: Ministry to Embassies, Head of the Mossad to Mossad, June 1, 1967; Head of the Mossad to Mossad, June 2, 1967; LBJ, National Security Files, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Box 18: W. Rostow to President, June 2, 1967; interview with McNamara, February 11, 2000; Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 43-45; Parker, Six Day War, pp. 124-125, 136.

53. ISA, 7919/1 Levi Eshkol Files, Diplomatic Telegrams, U.S.A.: Harman to Bitan, May 24, 1967; Rafael to Eban, June 4, 1967; Haber, Today, p. 203; Dayan, My Life, pp. 340-341; Rabin, Memoirs, p. 97; Brown, Personal Stamp, p. 35; Eban, Personal Witness, p. 405; Laura Kalman, Abe Fortas: A Biography (New Haven: Yale, 1990), pp. 300-301; Parker, Miscalculation, pp. 119-120; Rafael, Destination Peace, pp. 153-154. Fortas message cited in Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 45-46.

54. LBJ, National Security Files, History of the Middle East Conflict, Box 20: United States Policy and Diplomacy in the Middle East Crisis, May 15-June 10, 1967, pp. 96-97; Arthur J. Goldberg oral history, p. 22; ISA, 7919/1 Levi Eshkol Files, Diplomatic Telegrams: U.S.A.: Rafael to Eban, June 4, 1967; Gluska, Dispute, pp. 38-44; Haber, Today, pp. 203-212; Rabin, Memoirs, pp. 96-97; Dayan, My Life, pp. 338-341; Brown, Personal Stamp, pp. 28-35; Aharon Yariv, Cautious Assessment: An Anthology (Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 1998), pp. 57-58 [Hebrew]; interview with Merom.

55. Haber, Today, pp. 216-218 (Amit quote); Dayan, My Life, p. 342; Amit, Report on Visit to the United States, June 4, 1967.

56. Haber, Today, pp. 206-214; Rabin, Memoirs, pp. 96-97; Sharon, Warrior, pp. 185-186; Brown, Personal Stamp, pp. 28-29; Gluska, Dispute, pp. 38-44; Mayzel, Golan Heights Campaign, pp. 48-50; Dayan, My Life, pp. 338-339; Yariv, Cautious Assessment, pp. 57-58; Hanoch Bartov, Dado: Forty-Eight Years and Twenty Days (Tel Aviv: Ma’ariv, 1979), vol. i, pp. 121-125. [Hebrew]

57. ISA, 4091/23 Foreign Ministry Files, Exchange of Messages Before the War: Kosygin to Eshkol, June 2, 1967; 7920/2 Levi Eshkol Papers, Diplomatic Telegrams, France: Meroz to Eban, June 3, 1967.

58. LBJ, National Security Files, History of the Middle East Conflict, Box 20: United States Policy and Diplomacy in the Middle East Crisis, May 15-June 10, 1967, pp. 97-98; Johnson to Eshkol, June 3, 1967; Intelligence Information Cable: France, June 3, 1967.

59. Haber, Today, pp. 206-219; Gluska, Dispute, pp. 38-44.

60. Haber, Today, pp. 221; Robert Slater, Warrior Statesman: The Life of Moshe Dayan (New York: St. Martin’s, 1991), p. 264.

61. Interview with Merom.

62. ISA, 7920/4 Levi Eshkol Papers, Prime Minister’s Speeches, Surveys, and Reports: Bitan to Harman, Evron, Eban, and Rafael, June 6, 1967; 7920/3 Diplomatic Telegrams, Negotiations: Harman to Prime Minister, June 6, 1967; IDF, 717/77, File 32: Summary of the Battle for the Southern Front, p. 29.

63. Haber, Today, pp. 228-231 (Eshkol quote and cabinet decision); Brown, Personal Stamp, pp. 58-59; Dayan, My Life, pp. 358-359; Ammunition Hill Archive, Begin to Motta Gur, June 15, 1992; Moshe Zak, Hussein Makes Peace (Ramat Gan: Begin-Sadat Center, 1996), p. 110 [Hebrew]; Hussein, My “War” with Israel, p. 73; Uzi Benziman, Jerusalem, City Without Walls (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1973), pp. 13-19 [Hebrew]; Nadav Shragai, Hill of Contention: The Struggle for the Temple Mount—Jews and Muslims, Religion and Politics, Since 1967 (Jerusalem: Keter, 1995), pp. 18-20 [Hebrew]; Eban, Personal Witness, p. 412.

64. USNA, Middle East Crisis Files, 1967, Box 1: Chronology of U.S.-Jordanian Consultations on the Middle East, June 7, 1967; PRO, prem 13 1620: The Middle East Crisis: Foreign Office to Amman, June 7, 1967; Amman to Foreign Office, June 7, 1967; FCO 17/493, Israel—Political Affairs: Foreign Office to Amman, June 7, 1967; Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, June 7, 1967; ISA, 7920/1 Levi Eshkol Papers, Diplomatic Telegrams: Eban to Eshkol, June 7, 1967; 7920/4 Levi Eshkol Papers, Prime Minister’s Speeches, Surveys, and Reports: Eshkol’s Remarks to the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, June 7, 1967; Remez to Levavi, June 7, 1967.

65. LBJ, National Security Files, History of the Middle East Conflict, Box 20: United States Policy and Diplomacy in the Middle East Crisis, May 15-June 10, 1967, pp. 129-133; USNA, Middle East Crisis Files, 1967, Box 1: Chronology of U.S.-Jordanian Consultations on the Middle East, June 7, 1967; ISA, 4086/4 Foreign Ministry Files, Security Council Meetings 2: Director General’s Office to Levavi and the Ministry; IDF, 192/74/1076: Round-Table Discussion on the Liberation of Jerusalem; 901/67/1 Central Command: Six Day War, Concluding Report, Part A; Haber, Today, pp. 233, 238, 242, 243 (Eshkol quotes); Zak, Hussein Makes Peace, pp. 110-115; Motta Gur, The Temple Mount Is in Our Hands! The Battles of the Paratroopers in Jerusalem in the Six Day War (Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 1974), pp. 410-419 [Hebrew]; Benziman, City Without Walls, pp.  20-21; Shragai, Hill of Contention, p. 21;Brown, Personal Stamp, p. 67.

66. PRO, FCO 17/493, Israel—Political Affairs: Damascus to Foreign Office, June 6, 1967; Haber, Today, pp. 241-245; Mayzel, Golan Heights Campaign, p. 203; Brown, Personal Stamp, pp. 83-85; Yehezkel Hame’iri, On Both Sides of the Heights (Tel Aviv: Levin-Epstein, 1970), pp. 25-31 [Hebrew]; Gilboa, Six Years, Six Days, p. 235; Bartov, Dado, vol. i, p. 101.

67. ISA, 7920/2 Levi Eshkol Papers, Diplomatic Telegrams, ussr: Tekoa to New York, June 7, 1967 (Kosygin cable to Eshkol); PRO, FCO 17/493, Israel—Political Affairs: Kosygin to Wilson, June 7, 1967; LBJ, National Security Files, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Box 23: Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, June 8, 1967 (Chuvakhin quote); Dagan, Moscow and Jerusalem, pp. 229-230.

68. The cabinet protocol appears in Zerah Warhaftig, Fifty Years and a Year: Memoirs (Jerusalem: Yad Shapira, 1998), pp. 186-189. [Hebrew] See also Brown, Personal Stamp, p. 83. Eshkol quotes from Warhaftig, Fifty Years,
pp. 190-191; Eretz Hagolan, 100 (1985), pp. 32-33; Haber, Today, pp. 244-246; Gilboa, Six Years, Six Days, p. 232; USNA, POL ARAB-ISR, United Nations Files, Box 1: Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, June 8, 1967; Carmit Guy, Bar-Lev (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1998), p. 139. [Hebrew]

69. Warhaftig, Fifty Years,pp. 189-191; Eretz Hagolan, 100 (1985), pp. 32-33; Haber, Today, pp. 247-250; Bartov, Dado, vol. i, p. 133; Brown, Personal Stamp, pp. 85-86; Hame’iri, Both Sides of the Heights, pp. 30-31; Mayzel, Golan Heights Campaign, pp. 258, 264-265.

70. ISA, 4086/6 Foreign Ministry Files, Security Council Meetings: Rafael to Tekoa, June 9, 1967; Dayan, My Life, p. 382; Rabin, Memoirs, pp. 115-116; Warhaftig, Fifty Years,p. 200; Bartov, Dado, vol. i, pp. 101-103; Mayzel, Golan Heights Campaign,pp. 230-232; Brown, Personal Stamp, pp. 76-77, 80, 87-88, 90-91; Haber, Today, pp. 250-253 (Eshkol quote); Amos Gilboa, “The Six Day War: Thirty Years After,” Ma’ariv, June 6, 1997, p. 15; Mayzel, Golan Heights Campaign, pp. 232-233, 255-257, 272-274.

71. Brown, Personal Stamp, pp. 94-95; Haber, Today, pp. 253-256. BGA, Diary, Entries for June 9 and 11, 1967; Mayzel, Golan Heights Campaign, pp. 317-318. Quotes from Warhaftig, Fifty Years,pp.196-199; Haber, Today, p. 256.

72. USNA, POL ARAB-ISR, Tel Aviv File, Box 6: Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, June 10, 1967; LBJ, National Security Files, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Box 23: Secretary of State to Tel Aviv, June 9, 1967 (Rusk quote); Box 17: The President in the Middle East Crisis, December 19, 1968; ISA, 7919/1 Levi Eshkol Files, Diplomatic Telegrams, U.S.A.: Harman to Eshkol, June 9, 1967; 4086/6 Foreign Ministry Files, Security Council Meetings: Rafael to Tekoa, June 9, 1967; PRO, FO 17/495: Israel—Political Affairs: Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, June 9, 1967; UN, DAG 1/5.2.2.1.2-2, Middle East: Rafael to Secretary General, June 9, 1967; Arthur Lall, The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967 (New York: Columbia University, 1968), pp. 77-78.

73. ISA, 4083/3 Foreign Ministry Files, Contacts with the Soviet Union: Katz to Foreign Ministry, June 10, 1967; 7920/2 Levi Eshkol Papers, Diplomatic Telegrams, ussr: Katz to Prime Minister, June 10, 1967; LBJ, National Security Files, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Box 23: Washington to Tel Aviv, June 9, 1967; Dagan, Moscow and Jerusalem, p. 232; Parker, Six Day War, p. 230; Eban, Personal Witness, pp. 425-426; Lall, UN and the Middle East Crisis,pp. 77-94; Dagan, Moscow and Jerusalem, p. 232.

74. Hame’iri, Both Sides of the Heights, pp. 187-188 (text of meeting with Eshkol, Dayan, and Elazar), 204-205. See also Bartov, Dado, vol. i, p. 106; Warhaftig, Fifty Years, pp. 191-192, 200; Brown, Personal Stamp, pp. 97-98; Mayzel, Golan Heights Campaign, pp. 332-333, 342-343; Rabin, Memoirs, pp. 117-118; LBJ, National Security Files, History of the Middle East Conflict, Box 20: United States Policy and Diplomacy in the Middle East Crisis, May 15-June 10, 1967, p. 152 (Barbour quote).

75. Interview with Ze’evi.

76. Eshkol quotes in PRO, prem 13 1623: Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, September 4, 1967; The Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2001), vol. xx, pp. 82-83, 87. See also Gazit, Innocents Entrapped, pp. 143-144; interview with David Kimche, August 26, 1999; Sadia Touval, The Peace-Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979 (Princeton: Princeton, 1982), pp. 134-153.

77. For his insights into the Jewish nature of Eshkol’s leadership, I would like to thank R. Haskel Lookstein of Congregation Kehilath Jeshurun in Manhattan.

78. “One of the Leaders of His Generation,” Ha’aretz, February 27, 1969, p. 2; “Eshkol—What Comes Next?” Ma’ariv, February 27, 1969, p. 8; interview with Miriam Eshkol.