Print5. In the last section of his letter, Avnery deals with “the most difficult moral question: Is it permissible to risk soldiers’ lives in order to spare the enemy’s women and children?” “Kasher’s answer,” he responds, is “unambiguous: It is definitely forbidden [to risk soldiers’ lives].” Once again, I said no such thing. This is neither the question nor the answer. Public debate regarding a difficult moral question requires the careful use of a surgeon’s scalpel. Avnery, it seems, prefers the blunt axe, which he waves in all directions, so fervent is his desire to condemn Israel and justify its enemies.
Without meticulously analyzing the profusion of fallacies that appear in the last paragraphs of Avnery’s letter, it is fitting to clarify several central points, though I will not repeat all the arguments upon which my point of view is based. These arguments were partially presented in my article in Azure and fully presented in an article I wrote in conjunction with Major General Amos Yadlin, “The Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: Principles,” published in Philosophia 34 (2006).
First, we must differentiate between a military operation in a territory that Israel effectively controls, and a military operation in a territory that Israel does not effectively control. The term “effective control” is borrowed from the laws of war, and indicates a combination of authority and the ability to rule an occupied territory. Effective control applies to an entire territory, such as the Golan Heights or the Gaza Strip, and not to a kibbutz in which terrorists have barricaded themselves, or a bank taken over by armed criminals. In a state of effective control, the responsibility for distinguishing between terrorists and noncombatants is placed upon Israel’s shoulders, since it is the effective ruler. In such a situation, a military operation against a terrorist is akin to a police action, which does not justify causing incidental harm to the lives of noncombatants. Under such conditions, it is possible that soldiers’ lives will be endangered in order to avoid harming noncombatants, just as it is possible that policemen’s lives will be endangered in order to avoid harming a criminal’s neighbors. On the other hand, when Israel does not have effective control over a territory, the responsibility for distinguishing between terrorists and noncombatants is not placed upon its shoulders, since it is not the effective ruler, and thus the nature of its actions is different.
Second, anyone who wants to describe the IDF’s goal as “a war with zero casualties,” as Avnery puts it, is obligated to describe it more inclusively, for example: “The goal is a war with zero casualties among Israeli civilians, zero casualties among Israeli soldiers, and zero casualties among enemy noncombatants.” The state’s responsibility, in an operation such as Cast Lead, is threefold: to minimize harm to Israeli civilians, to decrease harm to the soldiers fighting on its behalf, and to reduce harm to enemy noncombatants.
Third, the responsibility for minimizing injury to noncombatants, given that they are not involved in terrorism, entails the responsibility to separate them from terrorists, and to remove them from the area where combat is taking place. The IDF has done so in various ways, some of which were unprecedented both in their nature and in the effort involved in their preparation and implementation.
Fourth, if there is a contradiction between the attempt to minimize injury to soldiers and the attempt to minimize injury to noncombatants during a military operation in a territory that is not under Israel’s effective control—and after considerable and often successful efforts have been made to separate noncombatants from terrorists—then it is morally and ethically appropriate to give priority to the safety of the soldiers while still trying to reduce, as much as possible, harm to noncombatants.
Fifth, a military operation against enemy forces naturally poses a risk to soldiers’ lives. During Operation Cast Lead, soldiers were endangered by sniper fire, roadside bombs, mortar bombs, various rockets, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), booby-trapped buildings, kidnapping, and many additional threats. Placing soldiers in this kind of danger is justified because it is an inevitable part of fighting the enemy. Operating under such ever-present threats includes efforts to minimize injury to noncombatants, so long as such efforts do not involve increasing the danger to soldiers’ lives beyond that which is already present in any combat situation.
Once one takes these points into consideration, it is clear that there is no basis to Avnery’s claim that my viewpoint “necessarily leads to killing any person and destroying any building that might possibly pose a risk to these soldiers—in other words, a scorched-earth territory, emptied of people and houses before the advancing army.” It appears that Avnery does not comprehend my perspective, and perhaps he does not want to, since it negates his defense of Hamas. For Avnery, everything I have written in my essay to present and justify my approach is nothing more than “rhetorical flourishes.” It stands to reason that he is trying to exempt himself, under false pretexts, from seriously contending with complicated arguments that do not fit his simplistic and extremist perspective.
The moral and ethical questions surrounding the war on terror are important and complex. Public debate on the principles of this war should take place in an honest, responsible, methodical, and professional manner. Crude and baseless propaganda does not contribute to such a debate.
