I will now respond to several of Avnery’s criticisms of specific aspects of my essay:

1. “According to Kasher,” claims Avnery, “everything is permissible when facing ‘terrorists.’” I said no such thing. In the beginning of my essay I point to the obligation to “pay special attention to every aspect of the operation that is related to moral and ethical values. Decisions, commands, and actions should be closely examined in order to determine whether they appropriately manifested the moral principles of the State of Israel, the ethics of the IDF and the General Security Service, and the laws to which Israel is subject.” None of these principles, values, or laws conclude or lead to the conclusion that “everything is permissible,” nor does this assertion appear anywhere in the essay itself.

2. In my essay, I discuss the question “Was the decision to launch Operation Cast Lead justified under the principle of last resort?” given its goal of effective self-defense. According to Avnery, I answered this question “with a definite ‘yes.’ [Kasher] justifies this answer with the claim that ‘demanding that Israel engage in direct negotiation with a terrorist organization that does not recognize its right to exist cannot be justified.’” Again, I said no such thing. Since I do not have full and precise information regarding political contacts between Hamas and Israel, I expressed myself carefully: “The continued rocket attacks on Israel by the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, as well as Israel’s continued abstention from any large-scale military response in the face of this aggression, give rise to a presumption of justification regarding the state’s decision to take military action as a last resort.”

As an example of an option the Israeli government did not “exhaust” before embarking on a large-scale military operation, Avnery raises the possibility of direct negotiations with Hamas. I replied to this claim in my essay. First, there is no moral justification for demanding that a state legitimize, via direct negotiations, an organization that openly and explicitly wishes to destroy it, and deliberately and persistently attempts to harm its citizens. Such legitimization would only provide a basis for the continuation of the organization’s hostile activity against the state and its citizens. Direct negotiations with Hamas would not reduce threats, but would instead increase them.

A familiar response to this is that direct negotiations with Hamas would imply that the organization does in fact recognize Israel. This is erroneous, because the essential problem is not Hamas’s de facto recognition of Israel as an existing entity, but its unwillingness to recognize in principle Israel’s right to exist here as the independent state of the Jewish nation. Such recognition is not implied in direct negotiations about a ceasefire. Second, indirect negotiations may not provide legitimization, but they may assist in reducing threats. Therefore, it is worthwhile to pursue this option before embarking on a large-scale military operation. Indirect negotiations between Israel and Hamas have indeed taken place, but they did not reduce the threat to Israeli citizens from Hamas rockets.

3. Avnery claims that I fail to contend “with the claim that the entire operation was a form of collective punishment.” This is untrue. “A necessary condition for the justification of war,” I wrote, is that “the military action be carried out for the purpose of self-defense.” Collective punishment is not considered an act of self-defense and is therefore unjustified. I did mention the issue of “historic revenge” and the like as examples of wrong intentions that negatively reflect on the justification of a war. The statement that the operation was intended as a “form of collective punishment,” however, is an interpretive claim disguised as a factual one. As such, it does indeed assist Avnery’s efforts at distortion, but I am unaware of any substantial justification for accepting it.

4. Avnery is infuriated that I do not “believe Palestinian and international reports regarding the extent of death and destruction in Gaza.” He is unwilling to accept my claim that “it is impossible to reach any moral, ethical, or legal evaluation of an operation before an investigation of its political background and an inquiry into the military’s professional performance are completed.” It is at this point that the immoral nature of Avnery’s propaganda style is revealed. He states, “An investigation that is based solely on the testimonies of soldiers and commanders, and omits the testimony of the victims, is inherently farcical.” Therefore, a military investigation is unreliable. In contrast, according to Avnery, an investigation based solely on the testimonies of Palestinians in Gaza, and not on testimonies of soldiers and commanders, is unquestionably reliable; it is a genuine “report.” This is an obvious double standard. Avnery appears to believe that a one-sided investigation is reliable so long as it serves the interests of the Palestinians with whom he identifies, but it is not reliable if it raises or may raise any factual evidence that he may find inconvenient.

Professional integrity requires avoiding a detailed response to the various allegations that Avnery raises with regard to Operation Cast Lead, due to lack of reliable and available facts and testimonies on which to base it. Although the words of a propagandist are written with unhesitating ease, a writer of integrity should not carelessly draw factual or moral conclusions from insufficient data.