Jewish Sovereignty as a Theological Problem

Since the advent of Zionism a century ago, there has been one point of agreement between haredi Jews and the great majority of Zionists: The State of Israel has no theological significance. Although haredim generally acknowledge that they and their yeshivot have derived great benefit from the existence of a Jewish state, many still view it as an affront to divine providence, deserving of harsh punishment from God. And the mainstream of the Zionist movement, for its part, relates to the state as a humanitarian political undertaking aimed at saving the Jewish people from the danger of annihilation and gaining official recognition in the international community. This approach is often accompanied by a dismissive attitude towards traditional Judaism and its “diaspora mentality,” and an express wish that Israel become a “normal” society—that is, a secular society along European and American lines. Thus, although the Zionist and haredi worldviews could not be further apart, they are nonetheless united in rejecting the State of Israel as a theological phenomenon.

In contrast to these two views stands religious Zionism, which seeks in many ways—some moderate, others more radical—to set the Jewish state within a theological context. Indeed, it often looks to religion to provide the basis for national policy. Yet although religious-Zionist parties are almost always in the governing coalition, they have never succeeded in becoming a dominant cultural force, and have not substantially influenced the opinions of either of the other two camps regarding Israel’s religious significance.¹

These differing opinions undoubtedly have important implications for the character of the Jewish state. But a society still in the process of forging its self-image must also bear in mind how it is seen by the rest of the world. For in the final analysis, how we are perceived by others is an important component in how we view our own identity—and this is true no less for societies than for individuals. It is somewhat surprising, then, to consider how little attention Jews and Israelis have paid to the way non-Jews view the establishment of a Jewish state. At a time when religious movements are reasserting themselves in the Middle East and anti-Semitism is on the rise around the world, it is especially important to understand Israel’s profound theological significance for both its friends and its adversaries.

In contrast to the perception of most Jews that their state is decidedly secular, for both the Christian and Islamic traditions, the very existence of a sovereign Jewish entity has great theological implications. Their ideas about Jewish statehood are rooted in the foundations of their faith, and in ways that affect their relationship with Israel on a day-to-day basis. Jews and Israelis would therefore do well to note the vast differences between their understanding of the state as secular, and the perception by others that it is a theological phenomenon par excellence.

 

To outside observers, the foremost distinction between Israel and other countries stems from what appears to be an implicit contradiction between Judaism and sovereignty. To Israelis raised on Zionism, there is no such contradiction: The Jewish people was sovereign in its own land for a thousand years before the onset of its long and unfortunate exile two millennia ago. To them, and to many other Jews today, the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 represents not a creation ex nihilo, but instead the realization of an ancient Jewish idea.

Those versed in the Christian and Muslim traditions, however, are likely to think otherwise. For these religions, the juxtaposition of “Jewish” with “state” is problematic, if not patently contradictory. This opinion follows naturally from their understanding of Jewish exile: While for most Jews, exile was a political-historical defeat that was reversed through political-historical means, for Christianity, and to a certain extent for Islam as well, the exile of the Jews is a divine decree. In this view, Jews are denied sovereignty because they are Jews—that is, because they rejected the new gospel. The restoration of Jewish sovereignty therefore undermines the inner coherence of Christian and Muslim religious thinking, and challenges a fundamental premise of their faith.

From the beginning, Christianity acknowledged its Jewish origins, labeling heretical the tendency of some of its followers (particularly the Gnostics) to reject the Tora of Israel as the teaching of Satan. Indeed, the synoptic Gospels devote considerable attention to the prophetic verses of the Bible, and assign the prophets of Israel an important role in establishing the truth of Jesus. Moreover, the leaders of Catholicism went to great lengths throughout the ages to demonstrate that Christian faith is prefigured in the “Old Testament,” and that only the two testaments together form the foundation of Christian belief. Yet this consecration of Israel and its teachings also forced Christian thinkers to ask themselves how Judaism could have continued to survive after Jesus. Thus in the twentieth century, the Catholic Church—the most explicitly theological body with which Israel has had contact—made it clear that the establishment of a Jewish state contradicted theological positions dating back to the third century.

The focal point of classical Christianity’s attitude towards Judaism is the concept of “supersession,” according to which Christianity is the heir of Judaism, and the Catholic Church the heir of the congregation of Israel. Judaism, according to this view, is the Israel of the flesh, and therefore in essence false, whereas Christianity is the Israel of the soul. In other words, since the appearance of Jesus, only Christianity is the “true Israel” (verus Israel), while the Jewish people are, in some sense, illegitimate. The question for Christianity was, therefore, how it is possible to inherit the role and standing of a people that still walks the earth, and what form such a transfer would take.

The answer was based on the principle of reward and punishment. The Jewish people, it was argued, forfeited its status as the chosen people when it refused to accept the gospel of Jesus and brought about his crucifixion by the Romans. The punishment was the destruction of the Temple, the loss of political sovereignty, and the transfer of their birthright—the privilege of being bearers of the divine truth—to the Church. Thus we see prominent Christian theologians such as Augustine depicting the loss of Jewish sovereignty as the transfer of divine favor from Judaism to Christianity.² The implication is that the Jews, either as individuals or as a group, could never again possess anything remotely resembling sovereign status. Indeed, not only must the Jewish people be refused statehood, but individual Jews should not be permitted to hold positions of authority over Christians. The debased Jew would serve as eternal testimony to his forefathers’ crime of rejecting the divine message.

Ironically, the concept of the Jew as witness often protected Jewish lives: In the medieval period, Christians were forbidden to harm the Jews or their property, since their testimony was considered vital to the demonstration of Christian truth. In keeping with this doctrine, popes and cardinals often rose to the defense of the Jews against those who threatened them. Nevertheless, Christians generally saw themselves as duty-bound to perpetuate Jewish inferiority and humiliation on account of their heresy.³ There were, then, two aspects to the traditional Christian hatred of Jews: One was a savage, homicidal hatred, such as that of the Crusaders at the end of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, which sought to negate the physical existence of the Jews altogether; the other, based in Christian theology, accepted the fact of the Jews’ existence, yet denied their right to enjoy national sovereignty or hold positions of authority.

Against this backdrop, it is clear why the emancipation of Jews in Christian lands caused so much difficulty for modern Christian theologians. Emancipation accorded Jews the right to hold positions of power within the Christian world, a right they often exercised. The Church managed to reconcile itself to this situation by distinguishing between the Jew as an individual and the Jewish people as a collective: Christians could now grant civil rights to the former without recognizing the religious or political legitimacy of the latter.

The founding of the State of Israel shattered this system of beliefs. For Catholicism, an independent Jewish state bearing the name “Israel,” with Jerusalem its capital, was unthinkable. The Jews were acting as though their punishment had been only temporary. The resurrection of the nation that had supposedly forfeited its inheritance posed an unpleasant problem for its “rightful” heirs: If there were now two Israels in the world, which was the real one? By regaining its sovereignty, the Jewish people, who until now had been a witness to the truth of Christianity, in effect became witness to its untruth. Never before had Christianity confronted so immediate and powerful a theological conundrum. The establishment of the State of Israel may not have harmed the Church in any direct fashion, but it nonetheless dealt a major blow to the underpinnings of classical Christian theology.

The Vatican responded to this problem by downplaying its significance. The State of Israel, it argued, was actually something entirely secular, part of the ever-changing political situation in the Middle East. A handful of Jews wrested control over a piece of land (as it happens, a consecrated piece of land), and they continue to control it only through force of arms. These events had nothing to do with divine will or election, and therefore had no theological significance.⁴ Though the Catholic Church is well-practiced in this sort of improvisation, the very need for an ex post facto explanation attests to the difficulties the establishment of Israel caused. Nor does the decision by both Vatican and Israeli authorities to ignore the theological dimensions of the problem, at least in public, make them disappear. Indeed, the theological challenge posed by the Jewish state continues to be felt today in the Catholic Church and in much of the Christian world.

 

The Vatican’s difficulty in accepting Jewish sovereignty continues to influence the West’s attitude to Israel, particularly in heavily Catholic countries such as those in Latin America and Europe. According to Catholicism, the world was redeemed with the suffering of Jesus, and has remained since then in a beneficent state. The Church, Jesus’ earthly heir, will continue his project of redemption until the end of days. The Church and its leaders represent an unchanging reality; the authority of the pope and cardinals is timeless. Therefore, every change in the world constitutes a potential challenge to that authority. As a result, the Church seeks to preserve the theological status quo, and to integrate every major event into its pre-formulated interpretation of history.

But there is another, contradictory movement in Christianity, one sustained by apocryphal, millenarian visions. According to this movement, the reality in which people have lived since the death of Jesus is essentially temporary. It is soon to be replaced by the final redemption of the Second Coming, when Jesus will return to the world and establish the kingdom of heaven on earth.⁵ This “messianic movement”—messianic in the Jewish sense of the word—naturally runs counter to Catholicism, as it challenges the permanence of the Vatican’s institutions. Catholicism has thus always viewed messianic Christians as rebels and heretics, yet within the less regimented world of Protestantism they were given freer rein. These Christians are active today under the aegis of what is sometimes called “Protestant Evangelicalism.” They are particularly powerful in the United States, where they comprise numerous sects that are eagerly anticipating and preparing for the end of days.

For many of these groups, Israel’s establishment is less a theological conundrum than a good omen, a sign that redemption is near. For proof they point to a number of statements in medieval and early-modern Christian apocalyptic literature, according to which the ingathering of Jewish exiles in the land of Israel is one of the signs of the redemption.⁶ For once assembled, the literature goes on to say, the Jews will do penance for their refusal to recognize Jesus, and will ultimately accept Christianity. The Jews will see the error of their ways, thereby enabling the advent of the kingdom of heaven on earth.⁷

Not surprisingly, a great many Evangelicals have, over the years, become enthusiastic supporters of Israel, mourning its losses and celebrating its victories. They view Israel’s enemies as the emissaries of Satan, and the strengthening of the state as yet another step towards fulfillment of the millennial vision. Evangelicals wield considerable political influence in the United States; quite a few have attained elected office, often adopting a more hawkish line on the Middle East than most of their counterparts on the Israeli Right.

Of course, one of the great obstacles to stronger relations between Israelis and Evangelicals is the matter of Jewish conversion. The Jewish sensitivity to Christian proselytizing has led many Evangelicals to conceal this basic element of their faith and sometimes even to deny it, and to insist that the Jewish state is of purely political or cultural significance.⁸ At the same time, Israelis who benefit from their support have, in effect, been playing along with the ruse, for otherwise no relationship would be possible. Both sides, then, have an interest in being less than forthright about the particulars of Christian theology.

Clearly, however, for Evangelicals no less than for Catholics, Israel is first and foremost a theological phenomenon, even if political realities make it necessary to downplay this fact. Yet the Evangelicals, like the Catholics, also cannot accept Jewish nationhood as something permanent: Israel deserves support until the Jews convert, but this in no way constitutes a recognition of the right of Jews, as members of the covenantal Jewish people, to a sovereign state.

Jewish immigration to Israel in the past generation has further strengthened the Evangelicals’ millennial belief. At the current rate, the majority of the Jewish people will soon be living in Israel. From the Christian perspective, this is nothing less than an apocalyptic drama unfolding outside the realm of normal history. In contrast, many Israelis prefer to view Jewish immigration to their country as no different from immigration to the United States or Canada—that is, as something possessing demographic, political, and economic implications, but nothing more. Nevertheless, we should not be surprised if others see the phenomenon of aliya in a different light.

Over the course of the last generation, Israelis have increasingly become desensitized to the theological significance of the Jewish ingathering. Their focus is mainly on the difficulties involved in absorbing Ethiopian and Russian immigrants, and on whether immigration can preserve Israel’s Jewish majority in the long run. In contrast, Israel’s enemies see Jewish immigration as a form of colonialism, claiming that the state should be eliminated as part of the overall process of dismembering empires and transferring power to indigenous peoples. When Israel’s Christian supporters respond that Zionism is not colonialism, but rather the fulfillment of a biblical vision, they are in effect denying the secular character of the state, since no other country in the world was established on the basis of an ingathering of exiles. Thus, any attempt to justify Israel on these grounds is an essentially religious statement.⁹ Whereas Israelis, particularly secular ones, see no contradiction between Israel’s Law of Return and its status as a “normal” nation state, it is easy to see how the outside observer could attribute great religious significance to the ingathering of the exiles.

In sum, Christian theology is inherently incapable of recognizing the Jewish people’s right to a sovereign state—unless, that is, the Jews convert en masse to Christianity. It is inconceivable that the Vatican would ever recognize the State of Israel as a Jewish state, since doing so would rob Catholicism of its most important proof: That divine election was withdrawn from the Jews and transferred to the Church. While perhaps only a small portion of the Christian world is aware of the magnitude of this problem, a great many Christians, particularly in Europe, assume that there is an inherent tension between Judaism and sovereignty. While they see it as a given that other peoples have a right to national sovereignty, they continue to treat the existence of the Jewish state as something contingent, which must be continually justified. Similarly, criticism leveled at other states is directed towards their policies and their leadership; criticism leveled at Israel casts doubt on its very right to exist.

This is not necessarily anti-Semitism, at least not in the traditional sense. Rather, it is a visceral reaction to the notion of Jewish political equality and the Jewish right to sovereignty. As Christian theology demonstrates, the Jews need not be hated or rejected for their right to sovereignty to be denied. While this kind of prejudice is certainly milder than traditional anti-Semitism, which often resorts to violence, its very mildness also makes it harder to identify and to overcome.

A sense of guilt over the Holocaust is also a factor in Christian attitudes towards Jews and the State of Israel. When Christians accuse Israel of Nazi-like behavior towards the Palestinians, they are not simply saying that Israel’s policies are wrong; they are assuaging their feelings of guilt. As they see it, the Jews were granted sovereignty in response to their suffering in the Holocaust, but if they act like Nazis, they forfeit this right. Sovereignty is then transferred naturally to their victims, and the Jews revert to their “normal,” exilic status.

 

The theological basis of Muslim antipathy to Israel is far more complex. For a long time, this enmity has been primarily political (Israel as an agent of European colonialism in the Arab world), or cultural (Israel as a force of Western modernity that threatens the ethical foundations of Islam), or territorial (Israel as a conqueror of Muslim lands that evicted the legitimate inhabitants from their patrimony), or humanitarian (Israel as a cause of suffering and destruction in the Muslim world). Recently, however, the theological argument has begun playing a larger role.

Muslim propaganda increasingly portrays Israelis as infidels who wrested control of dar el-Islam, sacred Muslim land. Infidel dominion over Islamic holy sites, and the threat that this dominion poses to the sanctity of these sites, inflames the religious passions of a great many Muslims. Furthermore, this portrayal places Israelis within the context of Islam’s larger historical struggle against heretics, particularly those who sought to conquer Jerusalem and the land of Israel. Foremost among these heretics were the Crusaders; just as Islam’s war against the Crusaders is remembered primarily as a religious conflict, and less as a political and ethnic one, many Muslims view the current struggle with Israel in the same way.

Another theological claim that enjoys great popularity in the Arab world, particularly among Arab intellectuals, is that the Jews are a religious sect, not a nation, and as such are not entitled to political sovereignty. This argument denies the existence of a Jewish collective entitled to equal rights in the international community, and in turn denies the very concept of a “Jewish state.” This thinking has deep roots in Islamic teachings concerning the rights of religious minorities in Muslim society, a subject addressed extensively in the scholarly literature of the last generation.¹⁰ According to these teachings, Jews living in Muslim lands are a heretical group, and should be tolerated only out of respect for their monotheistic belief. Nevertheless, they are inferior human beings, and are not entitled to full human rights. Thus while the hatred of Jews was admittedly not as deadly in the Muslim world as it was in Christian lands, the perception that the Jews were spiritually and morally flawed certainly affected their treatment by Muslims in both the medieval and modern periods.¹¹ Here the religious prejudice against Judaism was transformed into a social prejudice that denies the Jewish claim to equal rights, either within Muslim society or in the international community.

This attitude considerably strengthens the sense that an injustice was done to the Muslims who were dispossessed of lands and status by the State of Israel. While this is not exactly theology, it is nonetheless a part of Islam’s attitude towards the Jewish state. Yet while this sense of religious anger has deep roots and great emotional power, it has not historically been a central facet of Islam’s campaign against Israel. In this respect, the Six Day War in June 1967 had a dramatic impact on the Muslim negation of Israel’s existence, in that it transformed the rejection of the Jewish state’s legitimacy into a fight regarding its borders: Subsequently, the Muslim focus, as seen in the Oslo agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, was mainly on negating Israel’s conquests in that war, and not on destroying the Jewish state entirely. Like the Vatican, Muslims, too, have generally chosen to focus on the political rather than the theological aspects of their denial of Jewish sovereignty. Particularly after the Oslo accords were signed in 1993, it became a clear Muslim interest to play down the religious arguments in order to encourage an Israeli withdrawal from as much territory as possible.

All this changed in September 2000, when the Palestinian Authority launched a war against Israel. Once again, both the religious dispute and the overall question of Jewish sovereignty were brought to the fore, primarily in the Palestinian demand for a “right of return” of Palestinian refugees into Israel. As a result, while some still believe that peace initiatives will generate enough momentum to ensure that Arabs accept the idea of a Jewish state, others view Arab acquiescence as a purely tactical move, and believe it will reverse itself the moment an opportunity to destroy the Jewish state arises. The “return” of millions of Palestinian refugees would be just such an opportunity.

It is important to note the religious overtones in the idea that Israel is an agent of Western culture seeking to subvert the religious, social, and moral values of Islam. Much of the Muslim world sees the West as a bitter rival whose material and spiritual values pose a direct threat to Islam. This explains why those Muslim countries that have adopted Western social or political arrangements constantly suffer fierce internal divisions. In such countries, however, hostility towards Israel helps to unify the ranks, and leaders seeking to introduce Western innovations sometimes encourage this hostility in order to placate Muslim extremists. It is worth noting that a familiarity with Israel does nothing to dampen this hostility: For the devout Muslim, the cafes of Tel Aviv represent not Israeli normalcy and humanity, but that same Western depravity and decadence that threaten Muslim civilization.

In short, the prevalent conception in the Islamic world is that Israel is a state of infidels who have no right to sovereignty. Even though Arab governments note with pride that the Jews who lived among them did not suffer persecution of the kind that befell their European brethren, the fact is that Jews in Arab countries lacked all rights to political autonomy and membership in the political elite. Thus, in spite of the theological differences between Islam and Christianity, historically speaking the perceived tension between Judaism and sovereignty was felt no less strongly in Islamic than in Christian countries. In the Arab world, the Jews were tolerated as long as they knew their place and recognized their inferior status.

Since the Arab world has not granted equal rights to religious, cultural, or ethnic minorities, the Muslim image of the Jew remains unchanged. At best, Jews are tolerated, but are nevertheless always suspected of wrongdoing, and are in no way considered worthy of self-determination—certainly not in a land Muslims believe to be rightfully theirs. Such a view does not distinguish between its historical, political, and religious implications; the Israeli presence in Palestine is insufferable because the Jews rebelled against their proper station.

While in colonial times, the Middle East and North Africa were a mosaic of ethnic and religious groups, in the second half of the twentieth century Islamic states not only won their sovereignty, but also cleansed themselves of religious minorities. The result is that today, no Arab state has a significant Jewish population (although a few Jewish communities remain in Morocco). Christian communities in Arab countries, such as the Maronites in Lebanon, the Copts in Egypt, and the French in Algeria, are dwindling, and are often oppressed. The same holds true for Christians in cities like Nazareth, Bethlehem, and Ramallah, where Palestinian Muslims constitute a decisive majority. Fifty years ago, Christians were well represented in the Arab world; not only did they fill leadership positions, they also founded important national and social movements.¹² Today, however, there is little religious diversity in the Arab world.

Since the Jewish state was established on territory Christianity had relinquished after its defeats in the Crusades, recognizing Israel was less problematic for Christians than for Muslims. Christian churches in the Holy Land have survived for centuries under non-Christian regimes, and while they may not be theologically comfortable with Jewish sovereignty, they do not view it as an unmitigated disaster. Islam, by contrast, cannot tolerate the subjugation of “Muslim” territory to Jewish dominion. Moreover, much of the Muslim world views the establishment of Israel as a kind of Christian penance for the Holocaust, and believes that the Christian world paid for its own wrongdoing by carving a Jewish state out of Muslim lands. In the Muslim view this is a terrible injustice to Islam, and only the elimination of Jewish sovereignty can remedy it.

 

If Christians and Muslims perceive Jewish sovereignty very differently from the way most Jews do, there is an even greater disparity on the question of what kind of state Israel should be. Of the nearly two hundred independent states today, not one combines religion and state in the way Israel does. Christian and Muslim countries usually do not represent a unique religious identity; Israel is one of the only countries whose majority belongs to a religion that is dominant nowhere else. India, for example, does have a significant movement seeking to equate the state with Hinduism, yet India includes many different religious communities, and no one would call it “the Hindu state.”¹³ Iran’s identification with Shiite Islam is not entirely unlike the situation in Israel, but Iran’s principal identity is Muslim, not Shiite. Likewise, Armenia and Ethiopia are associated with a particular form of Christianity, but their main religious identity is Christian. Israelis, however, are citizens of the only Jewish state in the world. Even if the individual Israeli protests that he is ideologically committed to the rejection of his religious heritage, he will still be viewed by others as a citizen of the Jewish state. Foreigners accept that some Israelis adhere more strictly to Jewish law than others, yet the complete identification of “Israeli” with “Jew” is never in question.

Jews and Israelis would do well to keep in mind that not everything that is obvious to them is equally obvious to outside observers. While most Jews see Israel as a fundamentally secular political entity, they must realize that other religions do not share this point of view. From the perspective of the latter, the ingathering of the exiles and Jewish sovereignty are laden with theological meaning. For Christianity and Islam, Israel never has been and never will be a “normal” country. For them, at least, there can be no distinction between Jewish religious existence and Jewish national life.

1. For an examination of these two conflicting approaches, see Menachem Friedman, “The State of Israel as a Theological Dilemma,” in Baruch Kimmerling, ed., The Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers (Albany: suny, 1989), pp. 165-215.

2. Aurelius Augustine, Against the Jews (Adversus Iudaeos); Eugene J. Fisher, “The Holy See and the State of Israel: The Evolution of Attitudes and Policies,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 24:2 (Spring 1987), pp. 191-197.

3. See James Carroll, Constantine’s Sword: The Church and the Jews (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2001), p. 248; Solomon Grayzel, The Church and the Jews in the Thirteenth Century (New York: Hermon, 1966).

4. Cardinal Augustin Bea, for example, thought that “the return of Jews to their ancient homeland… held no religious significance. It was a totally political phenomenon.” Anthony J. Kenny, Catholics, Jews, and the State of Israel (New York: Paulist Press, 1993), p. 47.

5. For an updated survey of the religious positions of these messianic circles in a comprehensive historical-ideological context, see Bernard McGinn, Antichrist: Two Thousand Years of the Human Fascination with Evil (San Francisco: Harper, 1994), pp. 250-280.

6. The main source of this belief is found in the New Testament: “And I heard the number of them which were sealed: and there were sealed a hundred and forty and four thousand of all the tribes of the children of Israel.... After this I beheld, and, lo, a great multitude, which no man could number, of all nations, and kindreds, and people, and tongues, stood before the throne, and before the Lamb, clothed with white robes, and palms in their hands; and cried with a loud voice, saying, Salvation to our God which sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb.” Revelations 7:4-10.

7. Nancy T. Ammerman, “North American Protestant Fundamentalism,” in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991), pp. 1-65.

8. An extreme example of this was the fact that the Mormon church, whose apocalyptic visions in some ways resemble the ideas of evangelism, abstained from missionary activity—which is its raison d’etre, the professed objective of every one of its believers-in order to set up a university on Mount Scopus in Jerusalem. The Mormons were required to conceal every obviously Christian feature and to refrain from any activity designed to disseminate their teachings among the Jews.

9. An attempt was made along these lines in the nineteenth century when Liberia was established as the land of American blacks returning to their African homeland. There is no need to expand upon the awful results of that experiment.

10. See, for instance, Bat Ye’or, Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide, trans. Miriam Kochman and David Littman (Madison, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson, 2002), pp. 58-60.

11. “The unbelievers among the People of the Book… shall burn forever in the fire of hell. They are the vilest of all creatures.” The Koran, trans. N.J. Dawood (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1971), 98:6, p. 29. For a discussion of the inferior status of Jews in Islamic lands, see Ye’or, Islam and Dhimmitude; Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam (Princeton: Princeton, 1984), pp. 14-15, 32.

12. Thus, for instance, Edward Said was “uprooted” first and foremost because the Arab-Christian milieu in which he grew up in Jerusalem, Egypt, and Lebanon no longer exists, not because of Israel but because of the wholesale aggression of Muslim Arabism. In a review of the Hebrew translation of Out of Place: a Memoir by Said, Ronit Matlon recounts that after the Oslo agreements she spoke with an educated Arab in Gaza and asked him the meaning of Said’s opposition to the agreements. The Palestinian’s answer was that “Said’s yes is not our yes, and Said’s no is not our no.” Ha’aretz literary supplement, December 5, 2001, p. 8. There were many Christians among the Arab national leadership, including the first Israeli Arab leaders—Sliva Hamis, Toufik Toubi, and Emil Habibi. All these have disappeared. Christians were among the founders of the Palestinian national movement and the heads of its first terror organizations-George Habash and Naif Hawatmeh, for example. It can be said that some of the founders of international Arab terror, which is currently fueled by fundamentalist Muslim fanaticism, were the Christians who headed the Palestinian terror organizations in the 1960s and 1970s.

13. A few years ago, this movement sent a delegation to Israel’s National Religious Party to learn from the experience of a political party that also represents religion and seeks to mold the state in its image. I am not sure to what extent these events influenced relations between India and Israel, which have improved significantly in recent years.