TO THE EDITORS:

In his article Alan Mittleman examines German Jewish thinkers Hermann Cohen, Martin Buber, and Franz Rosenzweig and their approach to politics as both desirable and an activity that aims at and succeeds in achieving salvation and redemption. Mittleman presents a straightforward and exhaustive comparison of these thinkers, who were themselves in frequent and open contact with one another. Unfortunately, the difficulty presented by the German language, in which they wrote the majority of their works, together with their dated theological-philosophical terminology, has the effect of frustrating the English reader (and, all the more so, the Hebrew reader) who seeks to understand their writings. Given the many studies dedicated to these thinkers, which themselves are guilty of employing technical, tedious, and incomprehensible jargon, Mittleman’s work should be applauded not only for its sophistication and content, but also for its vivid and eloquent language.

I have two short comments to add to the discussion—the first pertaining to Rosenzweig and the second to Buber.

Mittleman criticizes Rosenzweig’s call for Jews to abstain from politics for being impractical. He presents Rosenzweig as lacking an answer properly grounded in reality to the question of the degree of hope that should be placed in politics as an effective tool for salvation. Rosenzweig himself, however, acknowledged in his writings that for Jews to sever themselves from politics was impractical. Indeed, Rosenzweig did not pretend that his stance offered the most practical or the most ethically correct tool for attaining salvation in this world. On the contrary, he explicitly stressed the high cost of Jewish abstention from politics. Rosenzweig claimed that this cost was a predetermined measure of suffering that Jews accept upon themselves knowingly, in a spirit of self-sacrifice. Presenting Rosenzweig as someone who minimizes the importance of Jewish politics does not, then, present the whole picture.

With reference to humanity as a whole, Rosenzweig stresses the importance of politics. Although it involves many compromises, and may even require us to wallow in a reality that is far removed from the spiritual ideal, it is necessary in order to enlighten people and places still immersed in darkness. The salvation of the world and of humanity as a whole will come, believed Rosenzweig, from actions in the real world, and for this reason he assigns Christianity, not Judaism, an active leadership role in bringing nearer the future monotheistic redemption through missionary work. Rosenzweig’s exclusion of Jews from the political realm is an exception that in no way indicates disdain on his part toward the theoretical and ethical importance of political action, despite its failings.

Though Mittleman himself in no way denies these assertions of Rosenzweig, his presentation of Rosenzweig as “anti-political” distorts the reader’s impression of his full position regarding the question at hand, i.e., is salvation to be found in politics? According to Rosenzweig, Christianity’s advent in the political realm is an ethical and necessary action for achieving salvation, not only for Christians but also for Jews. This insight bears out my previous claim: Rosenzweig himself acknowledged the validity of Mittleman’s criticism. Despite this failing, however, he reaffirmed the claim that Judaism willingly accepts the painful price of abstaining from earthly politics.

As for Buber, Mittleman compares Cohen, Buber, and Rosenzweig on the basis of their different views of politics as a tool to be used for attaining religious and ethical salvation. He believes that Buber is both the most realistic of the three as well as the one who holds the most practical and positive outlook toward politics. Thus, Mittleman attempts to portray Buber as the most astute of the three because of his intelligent approach to effective maneuvering in the political realm. Furthermore, he claims Buber was most in keeping with the authentic approach of biblical Judaism. It should therefore come as no surprise that Mittleman is careful to present Buber as a philosopher and not as a prophet. This classification is encouraging, especially in light of a growing tendency to classify modern Jewish thinkers—including Buber—as prophets (See Eliezer Schweid’s approach to this issue in his compilation of articles Prophets to Their People and Humanity (Magnes, 1999) [Hebrew].)

However, Mittleman does ascribe a flattering title to Buber, whose appropriateness I would question: He describes Buber as an astute realist who understood the fundamental value of effective moral action in the political realm. To my mind, this presentation somewhat distorts the definition of realism in politics. Though Buber may be portrayed as a rather astute realist in comparison with Cohen and Rosenzweig, I am skeptical as to whether he can really be presented as such in comparison with generally accepted norms among most theoreticians of ethics and religion. Buber’s thought may indeed indicate the importance of balances and practical compromises, as Mittleman suggests, but in attempting to implement the ethos of a spiritually guided sanctification of reality, Buber, like Cohen and Rosenzweig, relates to reality more as a naןve idealist than as an astute and practical-minded realist.

Nicham Ross
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev