Is this really the case? In fact, no self-investigating body is reliable, particularly when it comes to a hierarchal institution such as an army. Moreover, the IDF does not—and cannot—obtain testimony from the primary witnesses to the events in question: the residents of Gaza themselves. An investigation that is based solely on the testimonies of soldiers and commanders, and omits the testimony of the victims, is inherently farcical. What kind of trial does not include testimonies from victims and eyewitnesses? And how many soldiers would actually stand up and accuse their comrades and commanders of war crimes, while putting themselves at risk of ostracism, reprisals, and even being labeled a traitor?

To return to the matter at hand, the essential moral question with regard to military conduct in the field relates to a situation in which soldiers are faced with a target that consists not only of enemy combatants, whom they are permitted to attack, but also of noncombatant civilians whom they are forbidden to attack. Kasher offers several typical examples of such a situation, such as a house in which there are “terrorists” as well as noncombatants. Should an army employ air strikes or artillery against this target, thus killing its inhabitants? Or should it send in soldiers to risk their lives in the attempt to kill only the enemy combatants? Kasher claims that there is no justification for risking our soldiers’ lives in order to save enemy civilians—in other words, an air or artillery strike should be employed.

This does not resolve the issue of why the Israeli Air Force was assigned to destroy hundreds of buildings that were not in proximity to our soldiers, and therefore posed no risk to them. It also fails to justify the killing of dozens of Palestinian traffic policemen at a ceremony marking the end of their training, or the killing of United Nations personnel who were leading food convoys. (Kasher also neglects to mention the IDF’s inappropriate use of white phosphorus, depleted uranium, and other carcinogenic substances.)

Let us return to the example of the building that houses both enemy combatants and non-combatants. During the war, the entire country heard in real time how an artillery shell penetrated a doctor’s apartment and killed most of his family members. According to the testimonies of Palestinian civilians and foreign observers (which Kasher considers invalid) many similar incidents occurred during the operation.

Kasher thinks highly of the methods by which residents are warned of an imminent military strike through handouts, phone calls, and the like. Practically speaking, however, Gaza’s civilians had nowhere to go. There were no clear and safe escape routes; indeed, many were killed while attempting to flee.

We therefore cannot avoid the most difficult moral question: Is it permissible to risk soldiers’ lives in order to spare the enemy’s women and children? Kasher’s answer is unambiguous: It is definitely forbidden. Indeed, the most important sentence in his entire article is “Therefore, in the dilemma at hand, the state should favor the lives of its own soldiers over the lives of the neighbors of a terrorist.” One should read this sentence several times in order to fully grasp its meaning. It states, in effect, that it is permissible to kill enemy civilians without restraint in order to avoid casualties among our soldiers. (In retrospect, we should be glad that the British soldiers who fought the Irgun and the Lehi did not conduct themselves in a similar manner.)

Tragically, it appears that the IDF operated in accordance with this principle during the Gaza war, and to the best of my knowledge, this was the first time it did so. In order to prevent the death of a single one of our soldiers, it was considered permissible to kill ten, a hundred, or even a thousand enemy civilians. The goal was a war with zero casualties for our side, and the statistics reflect this: There were approximately 1,400 casualties in Gaza, one- or two-thirds of which (depending on whom you ask) were civilians, women, and children. In comparison, six IDF soldiers were killed by enemy action (four more died in friendly fire incidents).

Kasher explicitly states that it is justifiable to take the life of a Palestinian child in order to kill a hundred “terrorists,” because the “terrorists” might kill children in Sderot. In reality, however, such thinking leads to the killing of a hundred Palestinian children in order to eliminate a single “terrorist.”

Once we get rid of the rhetorical flourishes in Kasher’s theory, it boils down to a simple rule: The state must protect its soldiers (“uniformed citizens,” as he puts it) at any price. This necessarily leads to killing any person and destroying any building that might possibly pose a risk to these soldiers—in other words, to the creation of a scorched-earth territory, emptied of people and houses before the advancing army. Any moral person can deduce a single conclusion from this, which completely contradicts Kasher’s: From now on, every decision to embark on warfare in heavily populated areas is a war crime.

Uri Avnery
Tel Aviv