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PDF FormatThis discussion brings us to the question at hand: What is the nature of forgiveness? To make the case for his take on the subject, Benziman cites a wide range of scholars, several of whom refer to forgiveness as a moral virtue. Moral virtues—justice, kindness, compassion, forgiveness, etc.—all share certain characteristics.3 Namely, they are concerned with goodness toward other people. The moral virtues begin with a person’s understanding of their meaning—in this case, of what forgiveness is—and subsequently require the motivation to put them into practice, or in other words, to forgive. This motivation is then expressed in behavior that reflects, as best it can at any given time, the nature of the virtue in question. We rarely find perfection in any expression of the virtues, but practice undoubtedly helps our expression of them to mature.4 Yet even as we practice the virtues, we should take care not to isolate them, attempting to practice just one at a time; rather, we must recognize that all the virtues work together, so that when, for example, a person practices forgiveness, he can and should exercise justice as well.
Furthermore, since in the end all the moral virtues are concerned with goodness, we must not distort the meaning of forgiveness by claiming for it the power—or necessity—of condoning, excusing, or forgetting immoral behavior. The virtue of forgiveness must not display weakness in the face of injustice; were it to do so, it would cease to be virtuous. Moreover, because forgiveness is not a legal act of remission, we must not confuse the act of forgiving with that of absolving, pardoning, or offering clemency. Since, however, forgiveness is expressed by individual decisions and actions based on the virtue of mercy, and not justice, it can nonetheless appear (incorrectly) to be at times unreasonable, and even unfair.
Finally, moral virtues are unconditional. By this I mean that whenever a person wishes to be kind, just, patient, or compassionate, he is free to do so. I can think of no contingencies that would prevent someone from being just to others if he wished to be. If a person has a particular understanding of justice and the desire to be just (to the best of her abilities), then she can exercise justice. The same holds true for forgiveness, and the ancient Hebrew tradition is clear on this point. Indeed, in his essay, Benziman frequently cites the Genesis account of Joseph, who forgives his brothers for their sins against him. This is a truly significant narrative, because it is the first story in any ancient tradition that details the process through which a person forgives other people. A key feature of the story is the unconditional nature of Joseph’s forgiveness: His brothers do not repent before he forgives them. True, he hears them lamenting their sins after they have been imprisoned; crucially, however, they do not recognize Joseph as the brother they sinned against, nor is their lament anything other than a product of naked self-interest. They lament because they believe they are being punished for their sin, not because they committed the sin in the first place. Theirs is hardly a strong moral basis for genuine repentance.5
Joseph’s forgiveness, by contrast, is highly emotional (he weeps three times and finally embraces his brothers), and his behavior is characterized by generosity, love and care, creativity, and a deep concern for his family—all of which are, as stated, attributes of God. He also acknowledges his brothers’ inherent worth despite the grave injustices they have committed against him. Significantly, once he reveals himself as Joseph, his act of forgiveness helps to save the Hebrew nation by ensuring its continuity. Thus, we may say that forgiveness played a vital role in preserving the Jewish tradition.
According to Aristotle, all moral virtues are expressed in relation to a mean (an average, a point of balance). In other words, their expression must be temperate and reasonable according to the situation at hand.6 Courage, for example, if expressed in an imbalanced way, can become reckless bravado, as in the case of someone who cannot swim but nonetheless dives into the sea to save a drowning man. At the opposite extreme is someone in whom the virtue of courage has never developed, and who hides under the bed rather than face any danger whatsoever. This principle of the mean also holds true in relation to forgiveness, which must be properly understood and expressed or else risk being distorted and misapplied. For instance, an extreme expression of forgiveness might be the forgiver’s inclination to dominate the one who seeks forgiveness by constantly reminding him of his transgression and his need to be forgiven—or, likewise, the forgiver’s inclination to be dominated, because he does not understand the difference between forgiveness and reconciliation: The former is a moral virtue, whereas the latter is not, since it always concerns at least two parties and is contingent on their coming together in mutual trust.
Societies do not require that all virtues be practiced to the same degree. For example, in order to preserve the virtue of justice, all societies have laws that prohibit certain behaviors. On the other hand, no society, past or present, has ever enacted laws requiring forgiveness. This is because forgiveness is a virtue grounded in mercy, and mercy is not a virtue required of societies. At the same time, even if not required by society, any virtue is good by definition. It is good, therefore, to act according to the merciful virtues, including forgiveness. We ignore such virtues at our own peril.
Finally, all moral virtues have a purpose.7 I do not mean that they have consciousness and move deliberately toward a specific end. Rather, once we understand what forgiveness is (an unconditional moral goodness directed toward those who have offended us) we can see a final purpose to it. Or, in the case of forgiveness, three final purposes: 1) for the forgiver to be as perfect as he can in expressing forgiveness, thus potentially restoring the forgiven to moral integrity and psychological wholeness; 2) for the forgiven to repent, change his behavior, and ask for—as well as accept—the forgiveness of those he has harmed; and 3) for the two (or more) parties involved to be reconciled or come together in mutual trust, perhaps for the first time.
