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TO THE EDITORS:
Jacques Schlanger’s “A Eulogy for My Death” (AZURE 36, Spring 2009) is a courageous and passionate meditation on death. While I agree with his main ideas, perhaps some comments would be useful.
Like Schlanger, most of us think of dying as a bad thing, assuming that dying means perishing utterly. Why is this? Likely, because the life we were to enjoy should we continue living would have both good features and bad, but, we assume, the good would outweigh the bad—in other words, life would be, on the whole, good. As such, anything that precludes our enjoyment of this good is bad. (Schlanger says that death is the measure of life, but with that I cannot agree. Rather, I would argue that life is the measure of death, in that death is bad for us to the extent that the life it precludes is good.)
Hence, dying is an evil precisely when, and to the extent that, continuing with one’s life would be good for us. But by the same token, it would seem that dying is good if the days or years remaining to us would be spent enduring great agony, terror, or humiliation. If such were the case, death would spare us from an existence that would be, on the whole, bad. Simply put, death is contrary to our interests when a continued existence would be good for us, and in our interests when that continued existence would be bad.
This reasoning suggests that, for many of us, there will come a time when it is prudent to end our lives, assuming that we have at our disposal a quick and relatively painless way to do so. This is a hard, cold truth for those of us who love life, such as Schlanger. Yet even for these people, suicide is sometimes a logical choice. There is no paradox here: We would rather live than die, but only on condition that further life would be good. If the life that remains to us will not be worthwhile, it may very well be in our interests to hasten our death. Thus, while it is odd to praise (or “eulogize”) death, as Schlanger does, it is entirely reasonable to accept that dying can, in fact, be beneficial. Each of us would be wise to consider what it would be like to suffer physical deterioration, debilitating illness, dementia, and the many other indignities that usually accompany advanced age, and subsequently decide whether, at some point, it might not be preferable to avoid them by bringing on our own death.
Of course, what is in our interests need not be morally permissible. Schlanger says that he would prefer to kill himself, or have himself be killed by his loved ones, if he ends up in the twilight existence of the severely demented. He also says that he would be willing to help his wife to die should she end up this way. But he does not say much about the moral questions involved. Clearly, he thinks that in certain circumstances, suicide, assisted suicide, and euthanasia are morally defensible. I might here venture to explain why: Presumably, there are two central reasons why it is morally objectionable to kill people. First, it is against their interests. Second, it is against their will, and hence violates their autonomy. Killings that cause great suffering or are not wanted are serious wrongs indeed. Suicide and euthanasia, however, often are not objectionable on either ground. When continuing to live would be bad for us, suicide becomes a rational choice, one fully consistent with our autonomy. The same can be said for euthanasia. Indeed, the best death surely would be one only a willing physician could deliver: quick and painless. Except, perhaps, for a death that comes during sleep, I can imagine no better a death for myself or a loved one than this.
Of course, planning to hasten one’s death is not the same as making peace with it. It makes sense to do the former only because (and when) the alternative is worse. But I am not at all convinced that we should attempt to reconcile ourselves with death, as Schlanger thinks we should. There are philosophers who claim that death, no matter when it comes, is nothing to us. If this attitude is what Schlanger means by making peace with death, I prefer war. But perhaps Schlanger means something else; perhaps he wants to be able to think about his death without anxiety or fear. This kind of making peace with death is indeed desirable. There is, after all, much associated with death that can be extremely painful, and it certainly seems wise to avoid this pain if we can (another reason for suicide or euthanasia). But again, even a painless death can be bad for us. Personally, I do not fear the prospect of a painless death, but I abhor any death at all that precludes my living well.
Steven Luper
Trinity University
San Antonio, Texas
