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PDF FormatAs for the shaping of Israel’s state center, I propose that we accept as a guiding light the political liberalism of John Rawls, which calls for the creation of an “overlapping consensus” between the main cultural groups of a state. I support this approach because I believe that Israel’s main religious groups could in fact consider themselves obligated to further the development of Israeli liberalism, despite the fact that they themselves participate in a culture whose core elements do not correspond to the principles of liberalism. In this context I distinguish between religious Zionists and Haredim. While religious Zionists are committed to important features of Western culture (such as liberal democracy) and even utilize them extensively (by studying in universities, for example, or reading literature, going to the theater and cinema, etc.), Haredim (as opposed to, for instance, the Amish) adopt the technological achievements of Western culture but are not prepared to place any value whatsoever on its spiritual products. I therefore contend that the political liberalism of Rawls can serve as a common framework for secular liberals and religious Zionists, but not for Haredim.
I will now briefly address several other points raised by Gordon.
1. Gordon claims that my proposal stands in contrast to the principles of democracy because “the most basic democratic right of all is the majority’s right to shape the national character,” and that “in Mautner’s world, the sizable majority that wants Israel to be a Jewish state would be barred from actualizing this desire.” Gordon’s perception of democracy is both minimalistic and formalistic. She ignores the substantive elements of democracy that require the majority to show consideration for the minority and refrain from causing it harm. Moreover, she ignores the fact that about one-fifth of Israeli citizens are Arabs and that, as I noted above, my proposal is premised on the continued existence of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.
2. Gordon claims that what bothers me is not the lack of consensus between Jews and Arabs, but rather the lack of consensus between secular and religious Jews: “To Mautner, Israeli Arabs are no threat, but Israeli Jews are.” Yet Gordon ignores the following remarks in my book about Israeli Arabs:
The combination of a large demographic presence; exclusion from political decisions; severe discrimination in allocation of state resources; a segregated civil society; the belief of the Arab group that the establishment of the state and its continued existence is based on the use of violence against them; the ongoing state of war between the State of Israel and the Palestinian people in the territories—is an explosive mixture: More than a few writers have pointed out the fact that a combination of just some of these elements in the relations between a majority and a minority may ultimately lead to a violent struggle…. Presumably it is only a question of time until their demands [those of Arab citizens] to change the definition of the state’s identity and their status in that state will echo through the public discourse. [This was written before the Arab “vision documents”—see below.] Clearly, such claims will encounter stiff opposition from the Jewish group in Israel. At best, the struggle between the Jewish group and the Arab group will be conducted peacefully. But it is quite possible that the struggle will be violent and its results inconceivable.
3. Gordon writes that if my approach is accepted, “subcultures (mainly religious ones) disfavored by the former hegemons would actually have less autonomy at the sub-state level than they do today.” However, I state explicitly that for the purpose of evaluating problematic cultural practices of non-liberal groups, the state should apply not the political theory of liberalism identified with the “former hegemons,” but rather the doctrine of human rights, the principles of which can be found in all the world’s major religions and cultures, including Judaism. More-over, I hold that the doctrine of human rights and the concept of human dignity should also be applied to the evaluation of the cultural practices of liberal groups, including those of Israel’s former hegemons.
4. Gordon writes that my position regarding appointment to the courts is that “only those who accept Mautner’s values may serve on the [Supreme] Court.” In fact, my position is far more nuanced. Because the courts, in contrast to elected parliaments, are bound by “tradition,” a prerequisite of a person’s appointment to the bench is that he or she accept the basic principles of the state’s judicial tradition. Since religious Zionists accept the liberal tradition of Israeli law, one should welcome the fact that many of them serve as judges. Since Haredim do not accept this tradition, however, they cannot be appointed to the bench. Rather, I argue for their right to take political action in the Knesset.
5. Gordon claims that in reading my book, one gets the impression that “the vast majority of religious Jews were not every bit as law-abiding as their secular counterparts.” That is not the case. On the one hand, I do, indeed, cite certain voices in the religious Zionist public that, in the twelve years between the Oslo accords and the disengagement, called on soldiers to disobey orders on the grounds that the evacuation of facilities and settlements in the territories was contrary to the dictates of halacha. On the other hand, I wrote that we should avoid generalizations with regard to members of the Jewish religious group and keep in mind that significant portions of the religious Zionist public support the preservation of Israel’s liberal democratic system of government.
6. Gordon portrays me as someone who believes that “homosexuals are a distinct subculture just like Muslims, Christians, and Jews.” However, I state expressly that religious and national groups are “basic cultural groups” that regulate many aspects of the lives of the people who belong to them, and therefore their positions must be taken into account when shaping the state’s political and judicial center, while homosexuals, lesbians, and young people, etc., are merely “cultural groups,” and as such, their participation in the shaping of this center is not mandatory.
7. Gordon complains that “Mautner’s apocalyptic description of the danger posed to Israeli society by religious Jews sprawls over four pages. But he devotes exactly one paragraph to the Jewish-Arab conflict, focusing on the Arab riots of October 2000.” The reason for that is simple. The rabbis’ statements against obeying the government’s instructions, which are reviewed in the book, occurred over a period of twelve years, while the events of October 2000 went on for only ten days.
8. Gordon contends that my book ignores the “vision documents” of Israel’s Arabs, which were published about two years ago. The reason for that is technical: The documents were published after the book was submitted to the publisher and already in the advanced stages of editing. I hope to deal with the documents in a future book.
9. Gordon claims that “remarkably,” I ignore a fact that I myself mentioned: That despite Canada’s enormous investment in multiculturalism over more than forty years, the Qébécois minority’s separatist tendencies have only increased. However, I explain explicitly that the multicultural dialogue that has been taking place in Canada in recent decades is concerned primarily with the absorption of immigrants, while the problem of Quebec is perceived as belonging to a different discourse, i.e., the binational one.
10. And finally, Gordon writes that people like me find themselves “at a distinct disadvantage. Being a tiny minority, they have no chance of getting their way through democratic means. For three decades, they have tried instead to impose their will by judicial fiat, but Mautner realizes that this experiment is approaching a dead end. A new tactic is therefore needed, and this book is Mautner’s effort to supply one: the stealthy imposition of a court-enforced extreme liberal agenda under the innocuous guise of ‘multiculturalism.’” These words leave me no choice but to declare explicitly that I am not a tactician, nor am I, for that matter, in the service of any group at all (which will also become obvious to anyone who reads my book). I am not seeking to enforce a “stealthy imposition of a court-enforced extreme liberal agenda under the innocuous guise of ‘multiculturalism.’” I am an academic jurist who wishes to ponder Israel’s critical problems and propose solutions for them by utilizing knowledge of the disciplines of law and political theory. The fact that a profound and sophisticated author like Gordon refuses to accept my words at face value, and ascribes to me positions and intentions that are not mine, only serves to indicate both the severity of the problems with which I am contending and the relevance of my proposals.
Menachem Mautner
Tel Aviv University
