Israel and the Palestinians: A New Strategy

By Moshe Yaalon

The former IDF chief of staff proposes a different approach to dealing with an old conflict.

This article has focused only on the constructive aspect of the approach I am recommending. The other, more demanding and no less important aspect is dealing with radical Islamic terrorism. It is important to remember that the regime established by Hamas in Gaza threatens not only the Jewish state, but the Palestinian Authority as well. Hamas’s rule in Gaza has been leading Israel and the Palestinians down a dangerous road of escalating violence with unforeseeable results. Abu Mazen and his deputies lack the strength to neutralize or contain the threat. As a result, Israel must shoulder this burden. Unfortunately, Israel’s leadership over the past few years has not demonstrated sufficient determination in tackling this problem, and has fallen into a series of devastating errors: the unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip, for instance, which laid waste to prosperous Jewish settlements and showed the world Israel retreating under fire; the postponement (time and again) of a large-scale military operation against the terrorist infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, which has allowed Hamas’ guerilla fighters to barricade and arm themselves in preparation for the inevitable clash; and the willingness on the part of Israel’s leaders to pay an exorbitant price for the release of kidnapped soldiers (and sometimes only their dead bodies), which sent a message to even the most moderate Palestinians that the armed struggle can achieve results unattainable by conciliation and cooperation.

No dialogue can succeed and no reforms will be possible so long as the Palestinians—and Arabs in general—believe that the Jewish state can be subdued by force. The American historian Daniel Pipes has correctly noted that it is not despair that encourages extremism among the Palestinians, but rather the hope and belief that the Zionist state can be defeated.⁶² If Israel hesitates to use overwhelming military force against the swelling abscess of terrorism in Gaza, its enemies may get the impression that its stamina is eroding and that it can be pushed into a corner. Such a perception of Israel poses a greater threat than any rocket attack and must be immediately rectified. For more than a hundred years, Jews living on this land have had to prove time and again that they are not afraid to fight. Sadly, it does not seem likely that they will be able to put down their weapons anytime soon. This reality was eloquently expressed by Moshe Beilinson in an article published in June 1936 in the Histadrut’s newspaper Davar, at the onset of the bloody 1936-1939 Arab Revolt. In response to the oft-repeated question, “How much longer?” Beilinson answered: “Until the most fervent warrior in the enemy camp realizes that there is no means by which to break Israel’s power in its land, because it has necessity and living truth on its side. Until they know that there is no other way but to make peace with Israel. This is the purpose of our struggle.”⁶³

The Israelis need not abandon their hopes for true peace with the Palestinians. The reorganization of Palestinian society in accordance with the principles outlined in this paper could feasibly serve as the foundation for a future settlement that would realize some of the hopes that were pinned on the Oslo process.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, such a settlement will invariably involve painful concessions. However, in order for it to become a reality, two conditions must be met: first, unequivocal Palestinian recognition of Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state; and second, the establishment of Palestinian self-rule on a solid economic, political, and security basis.

Unfortunately, the road leading to this destination is still very long. But sometimes, the longer road is in truth the shorter one. And it is clear that we will not arrive there if we continue to ride the rickety train that left Oslo and passed through Taba and Annapolis. The present diplomatic path, which forces Israel to make far-reaching concessions and take genuine risks in return for empty Palestinian declarations, is headed for war, not peace. At most, it can create an illusion of reconciliation and progress that will dissipate at the first sound of gunshots and bombs. In order to avoid repeating mistakes, both sides must get off the train to nowhere and board the one on the right track.

Moshe Ya’alon is a former IDF chief of staff and a distinguished fellow at the Shalem Center’s Adelson Institute for Strategic Studies in Jerusalem.

Notes

1. Quoted in Renate Wind, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Spoke in the Wheel, trans. John Bowden (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1992), p. 107.

2. Politicians and analysts have become particularly fond of the train metaphor in relation to the peace process. Shimon Peres, for example, employed it in an address to the Knesset on December 3, 2007. “Is that the train of history that has pulled into Annapolis?” asked Peres. “The road is still long and windy, and filled with dangers and ambushes. But even if the wheels shriek, the cars have been broken open, and the road is filled with mines, it is still agreed that our destination is peace. This is the goal that the older generation missed and the younger generation should not.” Knesset Chronicles, special session marking the 60th anniversary of the UN decision to approve the partition plan, December 3, 2007.

3. See, for example, Ronen Bergman, Authority Given (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2002) [Hebrew]; Yossi Beilin, Manual for a Wounded Dove (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2001) [Hebrew]; Gilead Sher, Just Beyond Reach: The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations 1999-2001 (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2001) [Hebrew]; Itamar Rabinovich, Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs 1948-2003 (Princeton: Princeton, 2004); Raviv Drucker and Ofer Shelah, Boomerang: The Failure of Leadership in the Second Intifada (Jerusalem: Keter, 2005) [Hebrew]; Matti Steinberg, Facing Their Fate: Palestinian National Consciousness 1967-2007 (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2008) [Hebrew]; Lev Grinberg, Imagined Peace, Discourse of War: The Failure of Leadership, Politics and Democracy in Israel 1992-2006 (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2007) [Hebrew].

4. As explained by Yair Hirschfeld, a lecturer at the University of Haifa and one of the architects of the Oslo process: “Prime minister Rabin, like Yossi Beilin and myself, thought that it was best to move ahead with the process relatively quickly and to take advantage of the trust and momentum that was gained in order to outline a policy that would promote stability as part of the permanent-status agreement…. A policy that promotes stability can exist only after the signing of the permanent-status agreement, but until that time, it seemed that the peace process could lay the cornerstones for stability.” Yair Hirschfeld, Oslo: A Formula for Peace—From Negotiation to Implementation (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2000), p. 272 [Hebrew].

5. This exact phrase appeared in a letter sent by Arafat to prime minister Yitzhak Rabin on September 9, 1993. The full text of this letter is available at the Jerusalem Media & Communication Center website: www.jmcc.org/research/series/dop.html#letters.

6. On April 24, 1996, the Palestinian National Council (PNC) convened in Gaza and adopted a resolution to amend the National Charter by canceling the articles that were contrary to the commitments made by Arafat in the Oslo accords. While the PNC declared its readiness in principle to change the document—in order to pacify the Americans and Israelis—it never actually did so. The original Palestinian National Charter, which calls for the destruction of the State of Israel, stands to this day.

7. In his interview with the Jordanian newspaper Al-Dustour, published February 28, 2008, PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas expressed pride in the Palestinians’ firm refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish state in the concluding statement of the Annapolis summit. This refusal, so he claimed, nearly blew up the summit. “Abbas in Briefing to Jordanian Al-Dustour: I Am Against the Armed Struggle—But in Future Stages Things May Change,” memri,Special Dispatch Series 1861, March 6, 2008, www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP186108. Chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat also confirmed this statement. Erekat, who engaged in intensive diplomatic talks with Israel in preparation for the summit, told reporters that the two parties were unable to release a joint statement because the Palestinian side refused to recognize Israel as a Jewish state. “Palestinians Harden Refusal to Accept a ‘Jewish State,’” Jerusalem Post, November 15, 2007.

8. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton, 1976), p. 87.

9. Voice of Palestine radio, April 22, 1996. Quoted in Steinberg, Facing Their Fate, p. 354.

10. Interview in Al-Arabi, June 24, 2001: “Faysal Al-Husseini in His Last Interview: The Oslo Accords Were a Trojan Horse; the Strategic Goal Is the Liberation of Palestine from the [Jordan] River to the [Mediterranean] Sea,” memri, Special Dispatch Series 236, July 6, 2001 http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP23601.

11. Recall the riots that followed the opening of the Western Wall tunnels on September 24-27, 1996, in which seventeen IDF soldiers were killed. Another incident was the eruption of violent riots on May 16, 2000, following the anniversary of the “Nakba.”

12. This is confirmed by Mamdouh Nofal, Arafat’s close aide and a former PLO senior official, in his book The Shattering of the Peace Process (Amman: Al-Ahlia, 2002) [Arabic]. The book is available online at www.mnofal.ps/books/intifada/?lg=ar.

13. Statement by prime minister Ehud Barak at a press conference upon the conclusion of the Camp David summit, July 25, 2000, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches%20by%20Israeli%20leaders/2000/Statement%20by%20PM%20Barak%20on%20Conclusion%20of%20the%20Camp%20Da.

14. In this sense, Arafat upheld the Palestinian tradition of responding with violence to partition plans. Note, for example, Arab reactions to the 1937 Peel Commission and the 1947 UN partition plan.

15. Arafat’s conduct shattered the illusion that had captivated some of his Israeli negotiating partners, that it was possible to settle with him on a pragmatic, rational basis. Former foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, a participant in the Camp David summit in 2000, admitted in an interview that he had reached the conclusion that “Arafat is not an earthly leader. He sees himself as a mythological figure.… At Camp David, it was clear that he wasn’t looking for practical solutions, but was focused on mythological subjects: the right of return, Jerusalem, the Temple Mount. He floats on the heights of the Islamic ethos and the refugee ethos and the Palestinian ethos.” Ari Shavit, “End of a Journey,” Haaretz Magazine, September 16, 2001.

16. Arafat’s double-dealing during the Palestinian Terror War is described in detail in Barry M. Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography (New York: Oxford, 2003).

17. Zakariya Zubeidi, former chief of the Al-Aksa Martyrs’ Brigades in Jenin, confirmed this in a recent interview with Haaretz. “Back in Abu Amar’s [the nom de guerre of Yasser Arafat] day, we had a plan, there was a strategy, and we would carry out his orders,” Zubeidi told the reporter. “Everything that was done in the Intifada was done according to Arafat’s instructions, but he didn’t need to tell us the things explicitly. We understood his message.” Avi Issacharoff, “Marching Toward Total Ruin,” Haaretz,April 4, 2008.

Recall that Hitler’s signed authorization of the “final solution” has never been found. In his book The Executors, historian Yigal Elam claims that there was never a need for such an authorization. All the senior German officials involved in the project understood what the Fuehrer expected them to do about the “Jewish question.” All that is required of leaders in situations like these, Elam writes, “is to create conditions where anything goes. The forces of popular pressure will do the rest. There will always be people with initiative, and there will always be people to push ahead. The initiative will materialize of its own accord and set off a chain reaction….” Yigal Elam, The Executors (Jerusalem: Keter, 1990), p. 185 [Hebrew].

18. Bergman, Authority Given, pp. 17-28.

19. See a special report prepared in May 2002 by a research group led by Israeli minister for parlimentary affairs Dani Naveh on the subject of “The Involvement of Arafat, PA Senior Officials and Apparatuses in Terrorism Against Israel—Corruption and Crime,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/5/The%20Involvement%20of%20Arafat-%20PA%20Senior%20Officials%20and.

20. An example of this is a speech Abu Mazen gave to Palestinian youths on August 20, 2005, on the eve of Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip: “Today the small jihad to free our land has ended and the larger jihad to build our homeland has begun.” Quoted in Ali Waked, “Major Jihad Has Begun,” Ynet, August 20, 2005, www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3130500,00.html.

21. The Koran, trans. N.J. Dawood (London: Penguin, 1999), 8:15-16, p. 177. For a discussion of Hamas’s worldview and its practical implications, see Steinberg, Facing Their Fate, pp. 219-294.

22. A detailed discussion of this topic can be found in the following collection of articles: Michael Keating, Anne Le More, and Robert Lowe, eds., Aid, Diplomacy and Facts on the Ground: The Case of Palestine (London: Chatman House, 2005).

23. These data were taken from a 2006 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development report, “The Palestinian War-Torn Economy: Aid, Development, and State Formation” (New York and Geneva: unctad, 2006), www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdsapp20061_en.pdf.

24. Steven Erlanger, “Aid to Palestinians Rose Despite an Embargo,” New York Times, March 21, 2007.

25. Elaine Sciolino, “$7.4 Billion Pledged for Palestinians,” New York Times, December 18, 2007.

26. “Economic Performance and Reform Under Conflict Conditions,” International Monetary Fund, West Bank and Gaza, September 15, 2003, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/med/2003/eng/wbg/wbg.pdf.

27. Senior American officials quoted on 60 Minutes November 9, 2003, estimated Arafat’s net worth to be somewhere between $1 and $3 billion. See, www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/11/07/60minutes/main582487.shtml.

In addition, Gen. Aharon (Farkash) Ze’evi, head of the IDF Intelligence Corps, testified before the Foreign Relations and Security Committee of the Knesset on August 13, 2003 that Arafat’s personal net worth is $1.3 billion. See “Israel: Arafat Worth $1.3B,” CBS News, August 14, 2002, www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/08/15/world/main518788.shtml. Due to the complexity and secrecy of the investments and international bank accounts that have been managed for Arafat by Muhammad Rashid over the years, it is unlikely the true sum will ever be revealed.

28. “Billionaires: Kings, Queens and Despots List,” Forbes, March 17, 2003.

29. Ronen Bergman and David Ratner, “The Man Who Swallowed Gaza,” Haaretz, April 4, 1997 [Hebrew].

30. Immediately before the outbreak of the Palestinian Terror War, in the third quarter of 2000, Israel employed nearly 120,000 Palestinians from the West Bank and nearly 30,000 from the Gaza Strip. These figures are quoted in “The Impact of Closure and Other Mobility Restrictions on Palestinian Productive Activities,” Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator, October 2002, p. 26, www.un.org/News/dh/mideast/econ-report-final.pdf.

#1396, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 8, 2008, www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2920.

31. The PA currently employs almost one-third of the Palestinian workforce—nearly 150,000 workers. In 2008, salaries of public employees totaled $1.4 billion—nearly half of the PA’s 2008 budget which presently totals $3.3 billion. See Muhammad Yaghi, “Financial Crisis Grips Fayad Government,” PolicyWatch

In 2007, the PA’s fiscal deficit stood at 28 percent of the GNP. Even after the implementation of the 2008-2010 Palestinian Reform and Development Plan, the PA’s annual deficit is projected to total $1.3 billion. See the IMF report on “Macroeconomic and Fiscal Framework for the West Bank and Gaza First Review of Progress,” Staff Report for the Meeting of the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee, May 2, 2008, www.imf.org/external/np/wbg/2008/pdf/050208.pdf. For an analysis of the factors that led to the expansion of the Palestinian public sector see Amir Kulick, “International Social Welfare? Socioeconomic Aspects of the Economic Crisis in the Palestinian Authority,” Strategic Assessment 10:1 (June 2007), www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=16.

32. “Deep poverty” is defined as a budget of 1,837 NIS for a family of six for food, clothing, and housing only.

33. Based on data released by the World Bank in May 2008. “Implementing the Palestinian Reform and Development Agenda,” Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee, May 2, 2008, http://domino.un.org/pdfs/WB_PalReformAHCLdoc020508.pdf.

34. The size of this force was in direct violation of the interim Oslo II agreement signed in September 1995, which stated, “During the interim period, the total number of policemen of the Palestinian Police in all its branches in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be no more than 30,000,” Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Annex 1, Article 4 [3], September 28, 1995, www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/heskemb2_eng.htm. See also Avner Avrahmi, “A Power That Be,” Haaretz,June 7, 2001 [Hebrew]. With time, the Palestinian security forces have been increasing and are presently estimated to number 60,000 policemen.

35. On this point too, the Palestinians violated the interim agreement with Israel that stated, “Except for the Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces, no other armed forces shall be established or operate in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.” Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Article 14 [3], September 28, 1995, http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/heskemb_eng.htm.

36. See, for example, Arnon Regular, “The Chaos in the Palestinian Territories Is Increasingly Becoming an Orchestrated Struggle Between PA Forces,” Haaretz, October 15, 2004 [Hebrew].

37. An English translation of the Basic Law can be found at www.mideastweb.org/basiclaw.htm.

38. The journalist Ali Waked offers a glimpse into this routine in his article “Palestinian Reporters Strike to Protest PA Violence,” Ynet, February 15, 2004, www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2874923,00.html [Hebrew].

39. It is safe to assume that Dahlan’s public campaign to eradicate PA corruption was a calculated move to strengthen his public image in preparation for the power struggle to follow Arafat’s death. See Ali Wakad, “Relations Between Dahlan and Arafat in Deep Crisis,” Ynet, November 4, 2001, www.ynet.co.il/articles/1,7340,L-1272968,00.html [Hebrew]; Ali Wakad, “Arafat Forced to Discuss Reform Plans for the PA,” Ynet, February 6, 2001, www.ynet.co.il/articles/1,7340,L-501008,00.html [Hebrew].

40. See Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook, “Kill a Jew—Go to Heaven: A Study of the Palestinian Authority’s Promotion of Genocide,” Palestinian Media Watch, January 2005, www.pmw.org.il/KAJ_eng.htm.

41. See Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook, “Palestinian Authority Libel: Prisoners Are Used for Nazi-like Medical Experiments,” Palestinian Media Watch, July 9, 2008, www.pmw.org.il/Bulletins_july2008.html.

42. For a detailed description of Abu Mazen’s 1982 Ph.D. thesis, in which he asserts that fewer than one million Jews were killed in the Holocaust and raises doubts over the use of gas chambers, see “Palestinian Leader: Number of Jewish Victims in the Holocaust Might Be ‘Even Less Than a Million…’; Zionist Movement Collaborated with Nazis to ‘Expand the Mass Extermination’ of the Jews,” memri, Inquiry and Analysis Series 95, May 30, 2002, www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=ia&ID=IA9502.

43. Noa Meridor, “An Examination of Palestinian Fifth-and Tenth-Grade Textbooks for the 2004-2005 School Year,” the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center (IICC), April 16, 2006. This report uncovered extreme anti-Zionism and incitement to violence in Palestinian schoolbooks. See, www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/as_nm_e.pdf.

44. Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook, “From Nationalist Battle to Religious Conflict: New 12th-Grade Palestinian Schoolbooks Present a World Without Israel,” Palestinian Media Watch Annual Report, February 2007, www.pmw.org.il/BookReport_Eng.pdf.

45. The PA’s chronic dependency on foreign aid is unhealthy, but it enables developed countries and international organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to oversee the rehabilitation of the Palestinian economy. This dependency also gives Israel the ability to pressure the Palestinians indirectly vis-א-vis donor countries interested in quelling violence and tension in the region, such as the United States and the European Union member states.

46. Akiva Eldar, “Investing in Fayyad,” Haaretz, March 22, 2008, www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/966961.html; Steven Erlanger, “An Economist’s Task: Building a Model for His People,” New York Times, August 25, 2007.

47. The plan is titled ‘Palestinian Reform and Development Program’ (prdp).

48. For the detailed plan presented by the PA at the Paris Donor Conference, see Palestinian National Authority, “Building a Palestinian State: Towards Peace and Prosperity,” Paris, December 17, 2007, www.imeu.net/engine/uploads/pna-full-report.pdf.

49. Guy Grimland, “Industry Without Borders,” The Marker, May 20, 2008 [Hebrew].

50. Ari Shavit, “The Portland Trust of Hope,” Haaretz, June 3, 2005 [Hebrew]. See also the Portland Trust’s homepage: www.portlandtrust.org/index.html.

51. This is already being done at roadblocks where sophisticated terminals are being built, such as the Jalama crossing north of Jenin and the Bethlehem and Nuaman (Masmuria) crossings that are part of the “Jerusalem Envelope.”

52. See Esther Pan’s report on “Reorganizing the Palestinian Security Forces” at the Council of Foreign Relations website, October 4, 2005, www.cfr.org/publication/8081/.

53. Aluf Benn, “Top U.S. General Lays Foundation for Palestinian State,” Haaretz, August 14, 2008, www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1009578.html.

54. See, for example, Avi Issacharoff and Barak Ravid, “Shin Bet: PA Has Arrested 250 Hamas Men over Past Month,” Haaretz, January 9, 2008; Avi Issacharoff, “PA Forces in Jenin Have Shifted Gears, Striving to Disarm Hamas,” Haaretz, May 22, 2008.

55. Avi Issacharoff, “U.S. Supervising Training of Elite PA Unit in Jordan,” Haaretz, April 7, 2008.

56. Aluf Benn, “Israel to Hand PA Hundreds of Military Vehicles and Safety Vests,” Haaretz, August 10, 2008 [Hebrew]; Amir Buhbut, “Israel Approves the Transfer of 1000 Kalashnikovs from Jordan to the PA,” Yediot Aharonot, September 5, 2008 [Hebrew].

57. Isabel Kershner, “In Nod to Fatah, Israel Removes Militiamen from Wanted List,” New York Times, July 15, 2007.

58. It is widely believed that terrorism stems from poverty and ignorance. A study published in 2002, conducted by Princeton University professor Alan Krueger and Jitka Malekov of Charles University in Prague, analyzed the social and economic background of Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon, Palestinian suicide bombers, and Israeli settlers involved in violent clashes with their Arab neighbors. The study found no correlation between support for terrorism or terrorist activity and living conditions or educational level. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malekov, “Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17:4 (Fall 2003), pp. 119-144, www.krueger.princeton.edu/terrorism2.pdf.

59. Palestinian National Authority, “Building a Palestinian State,” p. 16.

60. Precise data are available at the organization’s homepage, www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/westbank.html.

61. Guy Bechor, “A Piece of Paper or a Peace Agreement? A Few Sacred Rules,” www.gplanet.co.il/prodetailsamewin.asp?pro_id=868 [Hebrew]. Recall the peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon signed during Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982, which went up in smoke. On the other hand, one can point to the strategic relations that Israel and Jordan formed many years before they signed an official peace agreement in 1994.

62. Daniel Pipes, “Turning Abbas’s Logic on Its Head,” Jerusalem Post, December 26, 2007.

63. Moshe Beilinson editorial, Davar, June 23, 1936 [Hebrew].

64. This article did not set out to deal with the “core issues” of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict or the proper way to resolve them in any future settlement. That is precisely the rash approach that this article criticizes. Nevertheless, it is obvious that settling the refugee question cannot be postponed until the permanent-status negotiations. The Palestinians are reluctant to concede on this issue because they understand that it can undermine the Jewish character of the State of Israel. Israel, for its part, should push for the de-politicization of the problem and for a speedy humanitarian resolution. A study group of Israeli, Palestinian, and French economists, which met in Provence, submitted a report to senior Israeli security officials in November 2007. They estimated the total cost of resolving the refugee problem and settling the Palestinian right of return at somewhere between $55 billion and $85, or an estimated $14,000-$21,000 for each refugee. In the final analysis, this is not an unreasonable price to pay for resolving a painful tragedy of such magnitude. See Akiva Eldar, “Refugees and Jerusalem: A Question of Money,” Haaretz, November 24, 2007.

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