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PDF FormatThe report for which Eid was branded a collaborator proved to be the last major critique issued by B’tselem about the PA’s rights record, as the board of the Israeli organization decided “to focus its attention only on the obligations of the Israeli authorities,” and, regarding areas under the PA’s control, to “leave the monitoring and documentation to local Palestinian human rights organizations.”152 As Palestinian elections rolled around and the PA was given responsibility for six of the seven largest towns in the West Bank, Eid therefore left B’tselem in frustration and headed the team set up by Reporters Sans Frontieres to monitor the PA media during the campaign and elections.153 After the organization’s first report was released, Eid was held for 24 hours at a police station in Ramallah. Undeterred, he continued to lead that team in issuing scathing reports on PA practices throughout the campaign period and election day.
Though these three activists were not deterred by the PA’s campaign against them, their effectiveness in uncovering and reporting on human rights abuses was substantially impaired—a-Sourani’s by the loss of his organizational base, Eid’s by the damage to his reputation, and a-Sarraj’s by the difficulties of monitoring human rights while intermittently being thrown in prison and beaten. More significantly, however, the treatment meted out to these three sent a clear signal to their less intrepid colleagues, who in any event needed little encouragement to take a soft line towards the PA.
The net result of Arafat’s campaign against the human rights groups, coupled with the non-confrontational strategy adopted by Palestinian activists and B’tselem’s decision to focus on Israeli violations, was that the four most effective human rights organizations were silenced in advance of elections. In addition, PICCR acted as a defender of the government during Ashrawi’s tenure, and when it became more independent under a-Sarraj was harassed so substantially that its work was impeded. As a result, the human rights community that had been so effective in exposing Israeli violations was reduced to impotence in monitoring the PA’s abuses. The Palestinian police were left unhindered, the rule of law was left with few defenders, and the previously independent media were victimized with little recourse. During the campaign, there were few human rights activists publicly critical of the PA’s abuses, which enabled Arafat’s security forces to accelerate their campaign of terrorizing opponents without paying a commensurate price in heightened international criticism.
Though these three activists were not deterred by the PA’s campaign against them, their effectiveness in uncovering and reporting on human rights abuses was substantially impaired—a-Sourani’s by the loss of his organizational base, Eid’s by the damage to his reputation, and a-Sarraj’s by the difficulties of monitoring human rights while intermittently being thrown in prison and beaten. More significantly, however, the treatment meted out to these three sent a clear signal to their less intrepid colleagues, who in any event needed little encouragement to take a soft line towards the PA.
The net result of Arafat’s campaign against the human rights groups, coupled with the non-confrontational strategy adopted by Palestinian activists and B’tselem’s decision to focus on Israeli violations, was that the four most effective human rights organizations were silenced in advance of elections. In addition, PICCR acted as a defender of the government during Ashrawi’s tenure, and when it became more independent under a-Sarraj was harassed so substantially that its work was impeded. As a result, the human rights community that had been so effective in exposing Israeli violations was reduced to impotence in monitoring the PA’s abuses. The Palestinian police were left unhindered, the rule of law was left with few defenders, and the previously independent media were victimized with little recourse. During the campaign, there were few human rights activists publicly critical of the PA’s abuses, which enabled Arafat’s security forces to accelerate their campaign of terrorizing opponents without paying a commensurate price in heightened international criticism.
VII
As the January 1996 elections approached, Arafat was assured of victory for himself and his loyalists in Fatah. The steps he had taken since assuming power had succeeded in bolstering his position and shunting aside most potential challengers. In fact, Arafat almost ended up running unopposed, as the best-known individuals who considered challenging him—including rights activist Iyad a-Sarraj and the popular Haydar Abed a-Shafi (who had headed the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid conference) decided that there was little point in running in the political climate that had been created. In the end, the only person who decided to face off against Arafat was Samiha Halil, a little-known, 72-year-old women’s rights activist, who was hardly in a position to compete for mainstream support in the traditional society of the West Bank and Gaza.
Nonetheless, Arafat took advantage of his monopoly on power to turn a sure victory into a landslide. He adopted an electoral system for the Council races that favored Fatah and undercut the chances of the smaller parties, and that played a role in persuading most Islamic and left-wing groups to boycott the elections.154 Within Fatah, he overturned the results of party caucuses and replaced independent-minded local nationalists chosen in balloting among party activists in each district with his own hand-picked slates—often dominated by loyalists who had come with him from Tunis. During the campaign, PA police stepped up their intimidation of candidates running against Fatah nominees for seats in the Council, while government ministers and other PA officials used the resources of their offices to further their candidacies. On election day, the massive presence of Palestinian policemen in and around the polls—in direct violation of the campaign law Arafat had promulgated—had a clear effect on voters. This effect was especially pronounced with regard to the approximately 100,000 illiterate voters, who were often “assisted” in filling out their ballots by policemen or Fatah officials.155
When the results were announced, it became clear that Arafat’s work had paid off handsomely. He received an overwhelming mandate, capturing 87.3 percent of the votes, compared to 9.9 percent for Halil.156 Though Arafat claimed that he “was looking for 51 percent,” he certainly did not mean it. Winning by a landslide was a strategic goal, whose purpose was to make him appear to be the unchallenged leader of his people.157 Arafat also got most of what he wanted in the Council elections: Fatah won 50 seats and candidates closely tied to it won an additional 17.158 Thus Fatah captured a solid majority on its own, while the broader bloc it commanded won more than three-quarters of the seats—67 of 88. Moreover, about half of Fatah’s 50 spots went to veteran PLO-Tunis officials who had entered the territories with Arafat, while the remainder were mostly local candidates drawn from the ranks of Arafat’s most loyal boosters.159
Since his victory at the polls, Arafat has continued to run the PA precisely as he did before elections. The PA police force has expanded apace, and today has more than 50,000 members. The government payroll has bloated further, and remains a patronage machine in which all important decisions are made by one man. Though Council members, in a rare display of independence, succeeded in passing a comprehensive basic law that would provide a constitutional framework, Arafat has refused to sign it, and the Palestinian Authority has at no point had either a discernible constitutional or legal framework, or anything like an independent judiciary. The media have continued to function as an adjunct of the government, while human rights groups—with a few notable exceptions, including organizations founded by a-Sourani and Eid—have remained weak and ineffective.160
More than three years have gone by since the second set of Palestinian elections were supposed to be held—Arafat and the Council were chosen for terms that were to end on May 4, 1999—but no new elections have been called.161 Ostensibly, the reason for this delay is that Arafat is waiting for the conclusion of final-status negotiations with Israel. But the real reason is that he was content with the results of his first election, and has not yet seen a reason to face the voters again. Even municipal elections, which were supposed to take place during the summer of 1996, have been delayed for six years; in the very long interim, Arafat has continued to make appointments to local offices himself, without the assistance of the voters.
In light of what Arafat did to secure his election victory and in light of the manner in which he governed before and after elections, it is clear that his standing as an elected leader hardly resembles that of the democratically chosen Western leaders who defend him. Thus the claim that he cannot and should not be replaced can hardly be sustained on the grounds of his democratic mandate or credentials.
What is true is that Arafat has made himself irreplaceable in a very different sense: He has acted successfully to destroy the elements of a pluralistic society that had been present in the West Bank and Gaza, and to mold the Palestinian Authority into a police state and a personal dictatorship. As a result, he has done much to damage the prospects of a viable, alternative leadership emerging. In other words, having succeeded in eliminating his opposition, he is now turning to the democratic world and pleading to stay in power on the grounds that he knows of no one who could replace him.
This argument sounds much like that of the apocryphal boy who kills his parents, and then pleads for mercy from the court because he is an orphan. Of course, it contains a kernel of truth: That is, the boy really is an orphan, and the dictator who eliminates his opposition really lacks an obvious successor. Yet it would be a grave mistake for Western leaders, and especially an American government that seeks to lead the free world, to accept the idea that Arafat’s success in building a dictatorship should entitle him to continue representing the Palestinians. On the contrary, Arafat has long ago demonstrated that his continued leadership is inimical to peace, no less than it is inimical to the Palestinians’ own aspirations for a regime that accords them basic freedoms.
It took Arafat nearly two years to pave the way for the electoral landslide that gave him the counterfeit aura of democratic legitimacy that still clings to him, and he has spent an additional six years strengthening his dictatorship and weakening potential opponents. The process of recovering from the damage he has done during this time will no doubt be a long one. But prolonging the current situation by attributing to Arafat a legitimacy that he does not deserve contributes nothing to that process.
Daniel Polisar is Editor-in-Chief of AZURE. During the January 1996 Palestinian elections, he led the observer team of Peace Watch, a non-partisan Israeli organization accredited by the Palestinian Authority as an official elections observer.
Notes
1. The speech in which Arafat repeatedly called for “martyrs by the millions” was made on al-Jazeera television on March 29, 2002. For an English-language translation, as provided by the Middle East Monitoring and Research Institute (memri), see “The War According to Arafat,” The Jerusalem Post, April 10, 2002.
2. Peter Slevin and Lee Hockstader, “U.S. Hangs On in Mideast; ‘Stakes Are Too High’ to Pull Out, Powell Says,” The Washington Post, December 14, 2001; interview of Colin Powell by Tim Russert, NBC’s Meet the Press, April 7, 2002. See also interview of Colin Powell by Brit Hume, Fox News Sunday, April 21, 2002. Both television interviews are available at www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002.
3. U.S. State Department daily briefing, March 26, 2002, available at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2002/9005.htm.
4. On the EU summit, see Suzanne Goldenberg, “Sharon Aims to Stir Uprising Against Arafat,” The Guardian (London), December 15, 2001; and Elaine Sciolino, “European Union Tries to Pressure Arafat, But Not Exclude Him,” The New York Times, December 19, 2001. For a full text of the EU resolution, see “European Council Meeting in Laeken: Presidency Conclusions,” available at the internet site ue.eu.int/newsroom/NewMain.asp?LANG=1. In a similar vein, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer called Arafat “the democratically elected leader of the Palestinians.” Judy Dempsey, “Europe’s Leaders Speak Up for Arafat,” The Financial Times (London), December 15, 2001.
5. Herb Keinon, “Israel Insists Uprooting Terror, Not Re-occupying, Is IDF’s Agenda,” The Jerusalem Post, April 7, 2002. Barry Schweid, “Powell Prepares for Another Round of Talks with Arafat and Sharon,” AP, The Canadian Press, April 16, 2002.
6. Jimmy Carter, “America Can Persuade Israel to Make a Just Peace,” The New York Times, April 21, 2002.
7. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area,” May 1994 (hereafter, “Gaza-Jericho agreement”). The figure of 750,000 residents for these areas is as of December 1993 and comes from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 1994, no. 45 (Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1994), pp. 52-53, 786. Throughout this essay, I rely on demographic data from Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics rather than the far higher estimates generated by the Palestinian Authority and the United Nations, as the latter are inflated, largely through inclusion of people who no longer live in these territories.
8. On the composition of the PA’s executive body, see Gaza-Jericho agreement, article 4; on the PA police force’s parameters for men and weapons, see Gaza-Jericho agreement, annex 1, article 3.
9. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements,” September 1993 (hereafter, “DOP”), article 3. The DOP actually had scheduled a three-month interval between the start of Arafat’s interim administration on April 13, 1994, and the holding of elections on July 13 of that year. Due to differences of opinion between Israeli and PLO negotiators, as well as an escalation of Palestinian terror, the detailed agreement about handing over Gaza and Jericho to the PLO was delayed, and Arafat was given de jure control over these territories on May 4, 1994 and de facto control two weeks later. Nonetheless, the date for elections remained fixed, at least on paper, and they were still due to take place on July 13.
10. The original Oslo accords called only for elections for a Council, but in February 1995 Israel acceded to Arafat’s request to hold direct presidential elections as well. The date of May 1999 was chosen because by that time negotiations were to be completed on the future relations between Israel and the nascent Palestinian entity.
11. DOP, article 13. The Palestinian Authority was, however, to be given at least five civilian authorities in these areas under the “early empowerment” agreement, set out in the DOP, article 6, sections 1-2.
12. On the PLO’s Jordanian period, see Andrew Gowers and Tony Walker, Behind the Myth: Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution (London: W.H. Allen, 1990), pp. 73-77.
13. On the PLO’s years in Lebanon, see Rashid Khalidi, Under Siege: PLO Decision-making During the 1982 War (New York: Columbia University, 1986). On the significance of the term “Fakahani state,” see Pinhas Inbari, The Palestinians Between Terrorism and Statehood (Brighton, England: Sussex Academic Press, 1996), pp. 243-248.
14. For a brief description of PLO governance since the founding of the organization, see Daniel Polisar, “Electing Dictatorship: Why Palestinian Democratization Failed,” doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 2001, pp. 87-99. For fuller treatments of this subject, see Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993); Barry Rubin, Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO (Cambridge: Harvard, 1994); Khalidi, Under Siege; Danny Rubinstein, The Mystery of Arafat, trans. Danny Leon (South Royalton, Vt.: Steerforth, 1995); Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1984); and Gowers and Walker, Behind the Myth. For a contrary view, that the PLO has grown increasingly democratic over time, see Manuel S. Hassassian, “Policy and Attitude Changes in the Palestinian Liberation Organization, 1965-1994: A Democracy in the Making,” in The PLO and Israel: From Armed Conflict to Political Solution, 1964-1994, ed. Avraham Sela and Moshe Ma’oz (New York: St. Martin’s, 1997), pp. 73-94.
15. There is a controversy about where Arafat spent his early years; though his birth certificate says that he was born in Egypt, he has maintained at different times that he was born in Jerusalem or Gaza. On this point, see Rubinstein, Mystery of Arafat, pp. 11-23; and Gowers and Walker, Behind the Myth, pp. 11-15.
16. On support for Arafat a few months after the PA was established, see Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS), Survey Research Unit, “Public Opinion Poll No. 13,” November 17-19, 1994. At the time, Arafat was preferred as president by only 44 percent of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.
17. In some respects, the monarchy of Jordan was more liberal in giv¬ing political rights to its citizens but less liberal in according civil rights, especially as regards freedom of expression and the establishment of human rights organizations.
18. On the relatively pluralistic inclinations of the Palestinian leaders and residents of the West Bank and Gaza, see Polisar, Electing Dictatorship, pp. 99-160. See also Ziad Abu-Amr, Civil Society and the Democratic Transformation in Palestine (Ramallah: Muwatin—The Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy, 1995) [Arabic]; Ziad Abu-Amr, “Pluralism and the Palestinians,” Journal of Democracy 7 (July 1996), pp. 83-93; Glenn Robinson, Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1997); and Joost Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women’s Movements in the Occupied Territories (Princeton: Princeton, 1991).
19. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who had to sign off on this delay during negotiations with the PLO, was motivated by a different consideration, Israeli security, which was made more salient by the unprecedented spate of terror attacks launched from Gaza shortly after the PA took responsibility for security there. Rabin wanted to delay the redeployment of Israeli troops outside of Arab towns in the West Bank, which in turn meant a delay in elections. Arafat wanted to defer elections, and was willing to tolerate a delay in Israeli redeployment.
20. Figures on Palestinian police come from Graham Usher, “The Politics of Internal Security: The PA’s New Intelligence Services,” Journal of Palestine Studies 25 (Winter 1996), pp. 22-23.
21. Amnesty International, “Palestinian Authority: Prolonged Political Detention, Torture, and Unfair Trials,” December 1996, p. 8. To put these numbers in perspective, Washington, D.C., which is the American city with the highest ratio of policemen to civilians, has one for every 160 residents; New York City, which ranks second, has one for every 200 residents. South Africa, which in international terms is considered to have a very large police force, has one policeman for every 440 residents. Statistics on the ratios of the police force and the civilian population of these American cities come from Carol D. Leonnig, “D.C. Found Ready for Emergency; Disaster Experts Rank City Seventh Among 30 in U.S.,” The Washington Post, March 2, 2002. Data on the South African police comes from “Police Population Ratios,” which can be found at www.saps.org.za/profile/popul.htm.
22. Likewise, Arafat began working to establish and recruit the PA police force shortly after the signing of the Oslo accords, well before he began planning the civilian wing of the government. See Hillel Frisch, Countdown to Statehood: Palestinian State Formation in the West Bank and Gaza (Albany: University of New York, 1998), p. 131.
23. Graham Usher, Palestine in Crisis (London: Pluto, 1995), p. 61.
24. Steve Rodan and Bill Hutman, “Order in Jericho, Part 1,” The Jerusalem Post Magazine, May 19, 1995, pp. 10f.
25. Al-Quds (eastern Jerusalem), February 2, 1995, cited in B’tselem, Neither Law Nor Justice: Extra-Judicial Punishment, Abduction, Unlawful Arrest, and Torture of Palestinian Residents of the West Bank by the Palestinian Preventive Security Service (Jerusalem: B’tselem, 1995), p. 13.
26. Usher, “PA’s New Intelligence Services,” p. 23.
27. Frisch, Countdown to Statehood, p. 133.
28. Peace Watch, “Survey of the Six Palestinian Security Forces, Totaling 5,000 Men, Which Currently Operate in Jericho and the West Bank,” July 17, 1995.
29. On the Rome Agreement, see Rodan and Hutman, “Order in Jericho”; and Usher, “PA’s New Intelligence Services,” p. 27. For a description of the negotiations by one of the participants, see Ya’akov Peri, One Who Comes to Kill You (Tel Aviv: Keshet, 1999), pp. 251-254. [Hebrew] Some Israeli government officials have denied that eastern Jerusalem was included in this agreement, but the lackadaisical behavior of Israel’s security forces in keeping PSS operatives out of eastern Jerusalem appears to belie this point.
30. Elections were held in the major West Bank towns in 1972 and 1976, but for a variety of reasons were not held subsequently. The figure of 7,200 full-time workers comes from Jon Immanuel and news agencies, “Sha’ath Leads First Authority Meeting in Gaza,” The Jerusalem Post, June 27, 1994.
31. A small number of changes were made in the PA cabinet subsequently, such as the addition of Hassan Tahboub as minister of Muslim holy places in September 1994, but they did not materially affect its composition.
32. Abed Rabbo was not a member of Fatah, but was allied with it, having split off from Nayef Hawatmeh’s DFLP (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) to found the Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA), which supported Fatah’s position on the negotiations with Israel.
33. The independent-minded leaders whom Arafat sought to coopt included Elias Freij, the Christian mayor of Bethlehem, who became minister of tourism; and Faisal al-Husseini, Arafat’s leading rival in the territories, who was induced to accept responsibility on behalf of the PA for Jerusalem affairs. In addition, the Palestine People’s Party (PPP), which was called the Palestine Communist Party prior to the downfall of the Soviet Union, had backed the Oslo accords but opposed the subsequent Gaza-Jericho agreement, which established the PA. Arafat therefore persuaded Abed al-Hafez al-Ashhab, one of its veteran leaders, to become minister of post and communications. Once within the cabinet, where they were outnumbered, their independence was reduced without their receiving any real ability to influence decision-making.
34. Arafat signed the decisions he published in the Official Palestinian Gazette as “Chairman of the PLO” and “Chairman of the PNA,” in that order—where PNA was short for “Palestinian National Authority,” a name Arafat used in order to demonstrate that he considered it to be the government of a sovereign state. The PNA logo generally appeared underneath the PLO logo on official stationery. To stress this point further, Arafat even took his own oath of office before Salim a-Za’anoun, the acting speaker of the Palestine National Council (PNC), which ostensibly is the supreme body in the PLO.
35. Oren Cohen, “I Will Navigate,” Kol Ha’ir (Jerusalem), August 12, 1994.
36. The “Law Regarding the Procedures for Preparing Legislation,” which was signed by Arafat on April 17, 1995, nearly a year after the PA was established, required the cabinet as a whole to approve laws before they became official. It was published as Law 4 of 1995, in the Official Palestinian Gazette 4 (May 6, 1995).
37. Loyalists such as Saeb Erekat, Abu Ala, and Yasser Abed Rabbo occasionally took the lead in developing proposals, but always in accordance with Arafat’s guidelines and subject to his veto.
38. In September 1994, Abu Ala publicly flirted with the idea of resigning because Arafat would not allow him any authority to make decisions.
39. Arafat ordered all workers to continue in their jobs in the “Decision Regarding the Work of Employees in All Government Offices,” Decision 2 of 1994, May 6, 1994, in the Official Palestinian Gazette 1 (November 20, 1994).
40. Al-Hayat al-Jadida (Ramallah), February 27, 1995.
41. Within a month of arriving in Gaza, Arafat had personally appointed 72 high-level officials in various ministries, as well as 27 senior advisers and functionaries for the Office of the President and its satellite organizations. These figures were compiled from appointments listed in the first two volumes of the Official Palestinian Gazette.
42. Iyad Sarraj, “Arafat in Gaza: A Year in the Life of the Palestine Authority,” in Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine (CPAP), The Palestine National Authority: A Critical Appraisal (Washington, D.C.: CPAP, 1995).
43. News agencies, “Arafat Moving Permanently to Gaza-Jericho Tomorrow,” The Jerusalem Post, July 10, 1994; Frisch, Countdown to Statehood, p. 137.
44. Al-Hayat al-Jadida, February 27, 1995; Nadav Ha’etzni, “Gaza on the Verge of Bankruptcy,” Ma’ariv, Shabbat supplement, May 5, 1995. See also Joachim Zaucker, with Andrew Griffel and Peter Gubser, “Toward Middle East Peace and Development: International Assistance to Palestinians and the Role of NGOs During the Transition to Civil Society,” InterAction Occasional Paper, December 1995, pp. 7-8.
45. Neil MacFarquhar, Associated Press bulletin, August 29, 1994.
46. Quoted in Cohen, “I Will Navigate.”
47. In some cases, even the token representation was skipped: In Gaza City, the seat of the PA government, Arafat asked Mansour a-Shawwa to assemble a coalition that included all major Palestinian groups, but after months of painstaking negotiation the PLO chief rejected Mansour’s proposal and asked a different member of the a-Shawwa family, Aoun, to set up and head a municipal council filled entirely with Fatah loyalists. Arafat himself presided at its opening session and retained a major role in running its affairs. For a description of Arafat’s role in the first meeting, see “The President Heads Meeting of New Gaza Municipality,” Jerusalem Times, July 29, 1994. On Arafat’s continuing role in running the municipality, see Aoun Shawa, “Municipalities and the Central Government,” in CPAP, A Critical Appraisal, p. 11.
48. Jerusalem Media and Communications Center (JMCC) Press Service, “Jericho Update,” August 9, 1994. The mayor Arafat subsequently appointed was also a high-ranking PLO officer, though he formally resigned his military commission upon receiving the office. Caryle Murphy, “Israeli-Appointed Mayor Steps Aside,” Washington Post Foreign Service, August 29, 1994.
49. Frisch, Countdown to Statehood, p. 137.
50. On the efforts by various offices of the PA to run municipal affairs, see Shawa, “Municipalities,” pp. 10-11.
51. Of these orders, close to 1,400 were applied to the West Bank and over 1,100 to Gaza. On the legal history of these areas, see the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)/The Center for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, The Civilian Judicial System in the West Bank and Gaza: Present and Future (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1994).
52. “Decision Regarding the Continued Validity of the Laws and Ordinances That Were Valid Before June 5, 1967,” Decision 1 of 1994, May 20, 1994, in the Official Palestinian Gazette 1.
53. To increase the rhetorical effect of his decree, Arafat worded it as if it applied to the entirety of the West Bank, and not just the small area around Jericho that was under the PA’s control.
54. Gaza-Jericho agreement, article 7, sections 3-9.
55. For a contrary view supportive of the complete abolition of Israeli military orders in the territories, see interviews with two prominent lawyers from Gaza, Raji a-Sourani and Faraj Saraf, in Richard L. Fricker and Gary A. Henstler, “From Military Rule to Civil Law,” ABA Journal, February 1994, pp. 62-65.
56. “We Will Work According to the Regulations That Currently Exist in the West Bank,” al-Quds, August 10, 1994; Zaynab Awna, “A-Nashashibi: The Current Tax Law Will Remain Valid in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,” al-Quds, September 5, 1994, p. 5.
57. Sa’id Ayad, “A Palestinian Committee to Change the Regulations That Are in Force in the Areas of the Autonomy,” al-Quds, July 7, 1994. The only change was that PA officials were to take over for their Israeli predecessors in exercising certain responsibilities for implementing the laws.
58. Guy Bechor, “The Palestinian National Authority Has Begun to Collect Income Tax and Value-Added Tax,” Ha’aretz, July 4, 1994.
59. “Law Canceling Several Decisions and Military Orders,” Law 2 of 1995, December 17, 1994, in Official Palestinian Gazette 4. The dating of this law from 1995, even though it was promulgated in late 1994, is from the original.
60. “Palestinian Jurisdiction for the First Time in the West Bank”, al-Manar, March 6, 1995; “Interview with Justice Minister Freih Abu Medein,” al-Quds, April 2, 1995; and “Rabin Will Determine Fate of Peace Process,” Jerusalem Times, April 7, 1995, p. 6; Khamis a-Turk, “A Committee in the Palestinian Justice Ministry Will Examine the Israeli Military Orders in Order to Cancel Those That Were Rejected,” a-Nahar, February 19, 1995, pp. 7-8.
61. Al-Aksa (Jericho), June 24, 1994.
62. On the use of PLO law, see Human Rights Watch/Middle East, “The Gaza Strip and Jericho: Human Rights Under Palestinian Partial Self-Rule,” February 1995, pp. 15-16; ICJ, Civilian Judicial System, p. 89; and Mona Rishmawi, “Features of the Administration of Justice Under Palestinian Rule,” The Review of the International Commission of Jurists 53 (December 1994), p. 31.
63. On Arafat’s promise, see Frisch, Countdown to Statehood, p. 141. For an English text of that early draft, see “Draft Palestinian Constitution,” Palestine Report, January 1, 1994.
64. According to the deputy chairman of the Gaza Bar Association, Nazem Aweidah, Arafat created the High Court for State Security on the basis of an Egyptian statute from 1957, even though that statute had been superseded by the Egyptian-installed Palestinian Constitution of 1962. John Tyler, “What Price State Security?” Jerusalem Times, March 31, 1995. Arafat’s decision establishing the courts does not cite this 1957 statute and cites only the 1962 constitution, which PA Justice Minister Freih Abu Medein claimed formed the basis for the PA regime. See al-Manar, March 6, 1995.
65. Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights Under Palestinian Partial Self-Rule,” pp. 27-28.
66. PICCR, Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens’ Rights Annual Report, February 1994-July 1995 (Jerusalem: PICCR, 1995), p. 30.
67. In doing so, Arafat was exacerbating a pre-existing problem: He inherited a legal system that had not enshrined merit-based appointments, had not guaranteed tenure in office for judges, and did not impose penalties against people who sought to compromise a judge’s objectivity. ICJ, Civilian Judicial System, pp. 87-88.
68. According to a survey of all the appointments listed in the Official Palestinian Gazette for the period from the establishment of the PA through the elections of January 1996, Arafat appointed five Supreme Court justices (including the president), four judges for Islamic courts, and an additional thirteen judges for lower-level courts. It is possible that additional appointments were made that were not included in the official listing of decisions.
69. Rishmawi, “Administration of Justice Under Palestinian Rule,” pp. 31-32.
70. “Decision on the Establishment of a High Court for State Security,” Decision 49 of 1995, February 16, 1995, in the Official Palestinian Gazette 4.
71. Amira Hass, “Only One of the Judges Appointed to the ‘Court for State Security’ in Gaza Possesses a Legal Education,” Ha’aretz, February 17, 1995.
72. According to Arafat’s spokesman, Marwan Kanafani, the courts were set up to deal with “cases which the president or state attorney refer to it.” Quoted in Jon Immanuel, “Arafat Establishes Courts to Try Security Suspects,” The Jerusalem Post, February 9, 1995.
73. Amira Hass, “Two Hamas Activists to Be Tried in the State Security Court in the Gaza Strip,” Ha’aretz, March 17, 1995.
74. Al-Hayat al-Jadida, February 20, 1995, p. 14.
75. For the most comprehensive report on the courts’ establishment and first trials, see Amnesty International, “Trial at Midnight: Secret, Summary, Unfair Trials in Gaza,” July 1995.
76. In one case, when the PA sought to pre-empt an Israeli request to extradite two murder suspects, a state security court in Jericho handed down its verdict in three minutes. See Roni Shaked, “The Trial Lasted 3 Minutes,” Yedi’ot Aharonot (Tel Aviv), September 13, 1995; and David Regev, “The Fastest Trial in the World,” Yedi’ot Aharonot, September 14, 1995.
77. David Regev, “A Palestinian Judge in Gaza Announced His Resignation—and Was Arrested,” Yedi’ot Aharonot, April 28, 1995. That story noted an alternative explanation for the judge’s resignation, that he had received death threats, presumably from Islamic activists unhappy about the trials.
78. Barry Rubin, The Transformation of Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to State-Building (Cambridge: Harvard, 1999), p. 59.
79. Peace Watch, “PLO and PA Compliance with Their Obligations Regarding Terrorism in the First Two Years of the Palestinian Authority,” August 5, 1996.
80. Amira Hass, “An Islamic Jihad Figure Remains Under Arrest, Despite a Decision of the Supreme Court in Gaza to Free Him,” Ha’aretz, April 16, 1995; Amira Hass, “Arafat Inaugurated the Palestinian Parliament Building in Gaza,” Ha’aretz, May 16, 1995.
81. Tyler, “What Price State Security?”
82. Amnesty International, “Human Rights: A Year of Shattered Hopes: A Report on Israel and the Occupied Territories, Including the Area Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority,” May 1995, pp. 16-19.
83. On the use of torture, see Amnesty International, “A Year of Shattered Hopes,” pp. 19-21.
84. For an overview of all six cases, see a joint report of the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group (PHRMG) and B’tselem, “Human Rights in the Occupied Territories Since the Oslo Accords: Status Report, December 1996,” p. 16. For detailed accounts of the first two cases, see Amnesty International, “A Year of Shattered Hopes,” pp. 20-21.
85. Investigations into the first two deaths in prison were ordered by high-ranking PA officials acting under Arafat’s orders, but only after the cases had led to a domestic and international outcry. Reports of the investigations were not made public, however, and meaningful punishments were never meted out. For details on the response to the first two deaths in PA prisons, see Amnesty International, “A Year of Shattered Hopes,” pp. 20-21. In one case, after it was announced that three policemen responsible for torturing a prisoner to death would be suspended until their trials ended, they posted bail and were returned to their jobs. PICCR, February 1994-July 1995, p. 15.
86. The situation in the broadcast media was in some respects worse for Arafat, as Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza generally watched Jordanian television and listened to the Israel Broadcasting Authority’s Arabic-language radio programs, neither of which had much good to say about the PLO.
87. Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights Under Palestinian Partial Self-Rule,” pp. 26-27; Danny Rubinstein and Yosef Algazi, “Palestinian Figures Pressuring Arafat to Cancel the Ban on Circulating a-Nahar in the Autonomous Areas,” Ha’aretz, July 31, 1994. Rajoub was referring to a-Nahar and to the pro-Jordanian weekly Akhbar al-Bilad.
88. Hanan Shlain, “Workers at a Pro-Jordanian Newspaper That Appears in Jerusalem Received Threats on Their Lives,” Ma’ariv, July 31, 1994.
89. The first issue after a-Nahar’s closure, from which these quotes are taken, appeared on September 5, 1994. For details on the PA’s actions against a-Nahar, see Peace Watch, “Freedom of the Press Under the Palestinian Authority,” January 16, 1996, pp. 30-33.
90. Roni Shaked, “Demonstration of Support for a-Nahar—Only 7 Journalists Came,” Yed’iot Aharonot, August 12, 1994.
91. The Ministry of Information played an important role in dictating how the media should cover events. See Oded Granot, “From Occupied Press to Frightened Press,” in Yearbook of the Journalists, Israel’s Jubilee (Tel Aviv: Association of Israeli Journalists, 1998), p. 67. [Hebrew]
92. For a comprehensive list of attacks against newspapers and journalists, see the reports on “Attacks 1994” and “Attacks 1995” by the New York-based Committee for the Protection of Journalists. The 1995 report is available at www.cpj.org/attacks95.
93. Rubin, From Revolution to State-Building, p. 77. Al-Quds also published an interview with Hamas spokesman Mahmoud a-Zahhar, who was critical of the PA’s role in the confrontation in Gaza.
94. Ori Nir and Amira Hass, “The Commander of the Gaza Police Again Delayed the Distribution of Two Newspapers from Eastern Jerusalem,” Ha’aretz, November 30, 1994. For more on the ban on distribution of these newspapers, see Peace Watch, “Freedom of the Press,” pp. 17-19; and Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights Under Palestinian Partial Self-Rule,” pp. 25-27.
95. In the summer of 1995, one reporter was held for several weeks by Palestinian police and the paper was shut down for a day by an order from a high-ranking PSS officer—acting, apparently, on orders from Arafat, who was displeased with an article prominently featuring one of his critics within the PLO. See Peace Watch, “Freedom of the Press,” pp. 28-30.
96. Al-Alami was finally released on December 30. At the interrogation facilities of the PSS, Rajoub personally questioned al-Alami, and, according to the latter, opened as follows: “Why didn’t you put the story on page one? Do you think you are better than the other newspapers? Do you hate Yasser Arafat? You are plotting against the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem, our capital. You are an agent of Jordanian intelligence.” Interview with Maher al-Alami, conducted for the author by Eli Hirsch in eastern Jerusalem, March 10, 1999.
97. On the comparison between military censorship under the Israelis and self-censorship under the PA, see Granot, “From Occupied Press to Frightened Press,” pp. 68-69; and Khaled Abu Toameh and Isabel Kershner, “Hot on the Press,” The Jerusalem Report, June 15, 1995, pp. 32-33.
98. Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights Under Palestinian Partial Self-Rule,” p. 27.
99. One exception to this pattern occurred when al-Quds was closed for a day in August 1995, and a-Nahar printed a small statement of solidarity, setting forth its position in carefully couched language: “Al-Quds was prevented from being circulated when the National Authority prevented its distribution for unknown reasons. Regardless of the cause, we express regret at the occurrence. President Arafat always advocated freedom of the press before the arrival of the National Authority… and after its arrival. He believes that journalism has a sacred message, and that freedoms, especially freedom of expression, should be respected.” Quoted in “PA Keeps Control of Newspapers,” Palestine Report, August 25, 1995, p. 7.
100. Peace Watch, “Freedom of the Press,” pp. 19-20. In the case of the better-established a-Tali’a, the Communist weekly favored by intellectuals, Arafat appears not to have tried very hard to effect a major change—presumably because he believed that its small circulation and highbrow style precluded it from having a wide impact.
101. Peace Watch, “Freedom of the Press,” p. 22.
102. Khalid M. Amayreh, “Abu Masameh Sentenced,” Jerusalem Times, May 19, 1995.
103. Peace Watch, “Freedom of the Press,” pp. 34-35.
104. For details on the actions taken against the two papers, see Peace Watch, “Freedom of the Press,” pp. 33-37.
105. Peace Watch, “Freedom of the Press,” p. 12.
106. Judith Miller, “When No News Is Bad News,” The New York Times, August 10, 1997. On the lack of independence of both these papers, see Granot, “From Occupied Press to Frightened Press,” p. 67.
107. It took the PBA several months to start airing regular programming daily, and as of August 1995, it had still not managed to reach its interim target of four hours a day. See “Palestinian TV on the Horizon,” Jerusalem Times, August 11, 1995.
108. UPI, “Palestinian TV Test Pattern on the Air,” September 8, 1994; David Regev, “In the Role of Haim Yavin, a 19-Year-Old Beauty from Gaza,” Yedi’ot Aharonot, December 7, 1994. For a behind-the-scenes look at how PBA programs were edited, see Michael Kelly, “Stillbirth of a Nation?” The New York Times Magazine, November 27, 1994, pp. 56f.
109. Khaled Abu Toameh, “Listeners Protested About the Praises for Arafat on the Voice of Palestine,” Yerushalayim (Jerusalem), December 2, 1994.
110. CPRS, “Public Opinion Poll No. 17,” May 18-20, 1995.
111. This obligation, stated briefly in the election law, was spelled out in an agreement between the Palestinian Central Election Commission and the Palestine Broadcasting Corporation concerning the campaign. See NDI/Carter Center, “Third Statement, Pre-Election Monitoring Program,” January 2, 1996, reprinted in NDI/Carter Center, The January 20, 1996, Palestinian Elections (Washington, D.C.: NDI and the Carter Center, 1997), appendix C, pp. 117-119.
112. The data used here to describe the imbalances in the electronic media and the written press before and during the campaign come from a series of reports issued by Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF), an international media watchdog that covered the Palestinian elections. The RSF delegation issued a series of five reports covering the period from December 15, 1995, to January 20, 1996. These reports, the periods they covered, and the dates they were issued are, respectively: “Access of Candidates to Palestinian Radio and TV Is Very Unbalanced” (December 15-25, 1995), December 29, 1995; “A Reduced Campaign on Palestinian Public Radio and TV and a Continuing Imbalance Between the Two Presidential Candidates” (December 26, 1995, through January 2, 1996, 6:00 p.m.), January 5, 1996; “Growing Imbalance in the Access of Candidates to Palestinian Media” (January 2, 1996, 6:00 p.m., through January 9, 1996), January 11, 1996; “Fair Access to Palestinian Public Broadcasting Only Respected in the Final Week of the Official Campaign” (January 10-18, 1996), January 20, 1996; and “Palestinian Television Deliberately Broke the Embargo on Election Publicity” (January 19-20, 1996), January 20, 1996.
113. Of this time, Fatah candidates accounted for 33 minutes, representatives of other parties ten minutes, and independents less than two minutes.
114. RSF, “Growing Imbalance,” chart 8. Peace Watch, which examined the three major daily newspapers—al-Quds, a-Nahar, and al-Hayat al-Jadida—during the first week and a half of the campaign, noted that these papers devoted a small amount of coverage to the campaign of Samiha Halil, including the publicizing of her events, and that there was even one op-ed piece in al-Quds praising her courage for undertaking the race against Arafat. At the same time, Arafat dominated the news sections and his picture appeared on the front page, along with favorable stories, in most issues of all three papers. See Peace Watch, “Freedom of the Press,” p. 16.
115. Peace Watch, “Freedom of the Press,” p. 16.
116. RSF, “Growing Imbalance,” chart 6.
117. “Decision Regarding the Establishment of the Supreme Palestinian National Committee for Human Rights,” Decision 59 of 1994, September 30, 1993, in the Official Palestinian Gazette 2 (January 8, 1995). For an English-language translation of Arafat’s decree, see PICCR, February 1994-July 1995, appendix A. The organization’s bylaws, in English translation, are reprinted in PICCR, February 1994-July 1995, appendix B.
118. Justus R. Weiner, “Human Rights in Limbo During the Interim Period of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Review, Analysis, and Implications,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 27 (Summer 1995), p. 828.
119. Steve Rodan, “Rights of Passage,” The Jerusalem Post Magazine, November 18, 1994, pp. 6f.
120. Raine Marcus, “Ashrawi, Arafat Discuss Beating Death of Palestinian Prisoner,” The Jerusalem Post, July 13, 1994.
121. Sami Aboudi, “Human Rights Group Says Gaza Prisons Improved,” Reuters World Report, September 20, 1994.
122. PICCR, February 1994-July 1995, p. 12. The complete text of both statements can be found in that annual report as appendices E and F. The first statement condemned the PA’s incarceration of Raji a-Sourani and the second one condemned the state security courts, three months and two dozen trials after they were established. Ashrawi did make a couple of brief, critical statements right after the courts were established, however. See, for example, Jon Immanuel, “Rabin-Arafat Summit Ends in Deadlock,” The Jerusalem Post, February 10, 1995, p. 1; and Jon Immanuel, “PA’s Security Courts Begin Working,” The Jerusalem Post, February 17, 1995, p. 2.
123. PICCR, February 1994-July 1995, p. 1.
124. PICCR, February 1994-July 1995, p. 21. The report did, however, contain a few trenchant criticisms, especially pp. 23-24 and 32-33.
125. Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights Under Palestinian Partial Self-Rule,” p. 20. PA officials also refused to provide an official response to allegations, which hindered those groups that were afraid to go public without a response from the government.
126. PHRMG and B’tselem, “Human Rights in the Occupied Territories,” p. 20.
127. On this point, see PHRMG and B’tselem, “Human Rights in the Occupied Territories,” p. 20. It should be noted that the report’s authors claimed that the phenomenon of fear did not become widespread until the latter half of 1996—a claim with which I disagree. On the basis of newspaper accounts, the reports of other organizations, and my own observations, I believe that by early 1995 the climate of fear prevented victims of abuse from sharing their stories with human rights groups.
128. Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights Under Palestinian Partial Self-Rule,” p. 27; Human Rights Watch/Middle East, “Palestinian Self-Rule Areas: Human Rights Under the Palestinian Authority,” September 1997, pp. 28, 35; PHRMG and B’tselem, “Human Rights in the Occupied Territories,” p. 20.
129. Ahmad Sayyad, quoted in Lisa Hajjar, “The Changing Face of Human Rights Activism in Israel/Palestine,” a special report of the Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, p. 5. No date is given for the publication, but the report notes that it is based on an August 14, 1997, presentation.
130. Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights Under the Palestinian Authority,” p. 31; PHRMG and B’tselem, “Human Rights in the Occupied Territories,”
p. 20.
131. Isabel Kershner, “The PLO Twilight Zone,” The Jerusalem Report, February 23, 1995, p. 27; Rodan, “Rights of Passage.”
132. For criticisms by al-Haq that were reported in the press, see “Palestinian Inquiry Ordered into Prison Death,” The Jerusalem Post, July 10, 1994; Ori Nir and Amira Hass, “A Human Rights Organization in Gaza Demands an Investigation of the Murder of a Collaborator by the Fatah Hawks,” Ha’aretz, April 5, 1995; Ori Nir, “Palestinian Human Rights Organization Calls on the Authority to Cancel the Regulations That Impair Freedom of Assembly,” Ha’aretz, July 19, 1995; Jon Immanuel, “ACRI Wants Demolition Order Rescinded,” The Jerusalem Post, October 6, 1995. Other al-Haq releases critical of the PA are noted in the Human Rights Watch/Middle East reports cited earlier.
133. That month, PHRIC protested the ban on distributing a-Nahar and criticized the death threats against a woman who argued that PA minister Intisar al-Wazir should not chair a conference sponsored by NGOs. See Jon Immanuel, “A-Nahar Shuts Down After Being Banned,” The Jerusalem Post, August 1, 1994; and Caryle Murphy, “Shooting, ‘Death Threats’ Leave Palestinians Uneasy,” Washington Post Foreign Service, August 22, 1994.
134. Weiner, “Human Rights in Limbo,” pp. 829-830.
135. Weiner, “Human Rights in Limbo,” p. 830. In September 1994, for example, PHRIC announced that the rights situation in the prisons of Gaza was improving. Aboudi, “Gaza Prisons Improved.”
136. Gaza Center for Rights and Law, “Appeal to Chairman Arafat to Reverse Decree Establishing a State Security Court,” February 12, 1995.
137. Barton Gellman, “Arafat Critics Harassed in Gaza Strip,” The Washington Post, April 11, 1995.
138. Tyler, “What Price State Security?”
139. Tyler, “What Price State Security?”
140. Gellman, “Arafat Critics Harassed in Gaza Strip.”
141. A-Sourani’s response was that the board members were “a cheap tool executing a policy” and that the reason for the firing was that “the PNA doesn’t like what we have been doing here.” His comments, as well as the response of the board, are cited in John Tyler and Karen Farrell, “Gaza Center Firing Threatens Human Rights Community,” Jerusalem Times, April 7, 1995.
142. See, for example, Gaza Center for Rights and Law, “Gaza Center for Rights and Law Expresses Excessive Concern Regarding What Takes Place in the State Security Supreme Court,” April 18, 1995. Lisa Hajjar, a scholar specializing in Palestinian human rights organizations, claims that “the PA took over the Gaza Center for Rights and Law and turned it into an official mouthpiece.” Lisa Hajjar, “Human Rights in Israel/Palestine: The History and Politics of a Movement,” Journal of Palestine Studies 30 (Summer 2001), p. 29. A-Sourani, for his part, decided to build a new organization, the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, but it took many months before it was operational and effective.
143. Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights Under the Palestinian Authority,” p. 32.
144. Jon Immanuel, “PA Arrests Noted Civil Rights Activist,” The Jerusalem Post, December 10, 1995.
145. Amnesty International, “Palestinian Authority: Prolonged Political Detention,” p. 15.
146. B’tselem, Neither Law Nor Justice.
147. “Palestinian Dies From Torture in PA Custody,” Palestine Report, September 8, 1995, p. 1.
148. “Palestinian Dies From Torture,” p. 1.
149. Though a number of other PA officials also joined in making accusations against Eid, Nabil Sha’ath offered a tepid defense of the B’tselem report. See Jon Immanuel, “B’tselem Demands PA, Human Rights Groups Condemn Rajoub’s Remarks on Fieldworker,” The Jerusalem Post, August 27, 1995.
150. Quoted in Larry Derfner, “Both Sides Now,” The Jerusalem Post Magazine, November 3, 1995, p. 11.
151. Derfner, “Both Sides Now,” p. 11.
152. “B’tselem and the Autonomous Areas,” The B’tselem Human Rights Report (Spring 1995), p. 9. B’tselem did, however, subsequently put out a joint report with a new organization founded by Eid, the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group.
153. Interview with Eid, conducted by the author and Eli Hirsch in Eastern Jerusalem, February 11, 1999.
154. On the adoption of the electoral system for Council races and the impact of this system on the decision of Islamic and left-wing groups to boycott elections, see Polisar, “Electing Dictatorship,” pp. 265-283.
155. On Arafat’s efforts to shape the Fatah lists, and on his behavior and that of other PA officials during the campaign and on election day, see Polisar, “Electing Dictatorship,” pp. 283-310, and reports of the various monitoring groups cited there.
156. These results are as reprinted in JMCC, The Palestinian Council, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem: JMCC, 1998), pp. 49-50. The remaining votes, according to the official results, were invalid.
157. Jon Immanuel, “Arafat Wins 88 percent of Vote; 75 percent of Council to Fatah,” The Jerusalem Post, January 22, 1996.
158. The classification system for assigning nominal independents to the parties is based on my own assessments, which are largely in line with those made by the JMCC in The Palestinian Council, which has become the standard reference on this subject. I am including in the Fatah bloc the single candidate elected on the ticket of the FIDA party, which ran in an alliance with Fatah.
159. Among the veteran PLO-Tunis officials who won positions were Tayyeb Abed a-Rahim, Nabil Sha’ath, Hakam Bal’awi, Intisar al-Wazir, Fayez Zeidan, and Abu Ala. Among the local loyalists who won seats, the most prominent were cabinet members Saeb Erekat and Freih Abu Medein.
160. On the nature of governance in the Palestinian Authority since the January 1996 elections, see Polisar, “Electing Dictatorship,” pp. 423-474; and David Schenker, Palestinian Democracy and Governance: An Appraisal of the Legislative Council (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000). For an optimistic account of PA governance in this period, see Rubin, From Revolution to State-Building.
161. On the requirement to hold elections by May 4, 1999, see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip,” September 28, 1995, article 3, section 4; and Palestinian Central Election Commission, “The Palestinian Council, Its Executive Authority, and the President of the Palestinian National Authority: Institutions and Competences,” December 31, 1995.
