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PDF FormatFurthermore, Poe fails to question Pipes’ somewhat old-fashioned understanding of early Soviet history. Much has been written about Soviet nationalist policy since Pipes’ The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923 (1964), but Poe does not take this into account. The Bolsheviks, contrary to Pipes’ conclusions, were not Russocentric. The Soviet Union did indeed become Russocentric, but only during World War II and, especially, its aftermath. On the one hand, nationalism of any kind was ideologically antithetical to the Bolshevik project; on the other hand, it was important to the Bolsheviks practically and pragmatically once they began to govern. A case in point is their treatment of the Jews in the 1920s. While Judaism as a religion was trampled underfoot, Yiddish culture was permitted and even celebrated. Indeed, Soviet Yiddish schools and collective farms were commonplace in the former Pale of Settlement. This is because the Soviet ideologues recognized that in the long run the Jews would assimilate, perhaps not into a specifically Russian culture, but certainly into a non-national Soviet culture. To accomplish this, however, the Jews would need to be indoctrinated in their own language, in this case Yiddish. Once again, this policy gradually changed in the 1930s and then radically shifted after the war.
At the end of his review, Poe returns to the philosophical plane. He claims that “Pipes is, ultimately, a firm believer in the power of culture…. Looking at Pipes’ life’s work, we can conclude, sadly, that autocracy will remain an important element of Russian culture, just as it has been for centuries.” This is a seemingly provocative statement, but it is at best highly questionable. To begin with, there is no discussion of Russian culture in Poe’s presentation of Pipes. And what Russian culture is he talking about? Piotr Chaadaev’s denunciation of Russia’s lack of history in 1829? Or Dostoevsky’s quest for the Russian Christ? Current post-modernist Russian fiction? Or Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago? The Russian case is not unique. All civilizations have trends, and some of them are invariably troubling. American racism, Western antisemitism, extreme Jewish messianism, and, yes, Russian autocratic conservatism are entrenched in the respective histories of these civilizations, but does this mean that these civilizations are inherently doomed by them? A critical, sober approach to history would suggest otherwise. One does not need to be a “non-belonger” to recognize that.
Marat Grinberg
Reed College
Portland, Oregon
MARSHALL POE RESPONDS:
Let me begin by thanking Richard Pipes for his kind words as well as for his years of service to the historical profession.
In his spirited response, Marat Grinberg rebuts someone’s arguments. Unfortunately, they aren’t mine. The “us versus them” framework he attributes to my essay does not exist. This is made clear by my use of distancing quotation marks throughout the text. The idea that there is some sort of “essential” Russian spirit isn’t mine: I do write that Pipes sought after the “spirit of Russian civilization,” but I never say or imply that there is anything essential about it. The thesis that Russia is “essentially different from Europe” isn’t mine, either: While I do think that Russia is different from Europe, and have argued as much in my book The Russian Moment in World History (Princeton, 2001), the idea that the difference is “essential” never appears in this review or in any of my published work. Finally, the plainly silly notion that Russians have an “inborn predisposition to autocracy” certainly isn’t mine. In fact, I cannot say I know anyone who believes such a thing. Somebody, somewhere, may think that Russia is “doomed,” but I don’t. My review says nothing of the sort. As a matter of fact, it suggests the opposite.
The purpose of reviews is to review books, not to give reviewers an opportunity to air their opinions. But since Grinberg seems both interested in and confused by my views, let me make them clear. I do think that cultures have “spirits” in the sense of sets of unexamined, taken-for-granted beliefs. I do think that the spirit of Russian culture was autocratic. I do think that Russia’s spirit arose due to historical circumstances. I do think that cultures can change. And I do think that Russian culture is becoming less autocratic, even now. Though I would not presume to say what Grinberg believes about these matters, I imagine that he will find much to agree with in those few sentences.
