Print
PDF FormatFor the most part, Diamond’s reading of Maimonides is “unfettered” by academic conventions. To his credit, he is independent of any particular school of thought. Regrettably, Diamond does not trouble himself to inform the reader as to his methodology, leaving us with no alternative but to try and infer it from the texts he chooses to analyze and the interpretative method he employs.
As previously noted, the two primary sources Diamond uses are the Guide of the Perplexed and the Mishneh Tora. Diamond works with both texts in parallel, moving from one to the other with ease. This method is based on the idea that in order to understand Maimonides’ position on a certain issue, one must examine all his writings on the subject, because they are in essence complementary parts of a coherent whole. Diamond’s entire book rests on this assumption, and without it his thesis collapses like a house of cards.
This methodological outlook goes against the conventional approach to the study of Maimonides, which holds that his writings can be classified as either halachic (those dealing with Jewish law), or philosophical. The Mishneh Tora, for example, is defined primarily as a halachic code, whereas the Guide is considered a philosophical work. In my opinion, and in this I concur with Diamond, this simplistic dichotomy does an injustice to the texts themselves. The danger of such an approach is especially apparent regarding the Mishneh Tora. Most scholars view the work as a collection of laws based on the Talmud. However, it is clear that Maimonides’ careful editing of this monumental composition, as well as the motivations he lists for various laws—sometimes quite different from those enumerated in the Talmud—is not insignificant: They represent a clear reflection of his philosophical worldview. Therefore, the artificial distinction between his “halachic” and “philosophical” writings only hinders our ability to fully understand the Mishneh Tora.
Diamond adopts a different approach, relating to the Mishneh Tora as a composition that expresses Maimonides’ philosophy no less than his halachic positions. This is a logical assumption, and I must admit that I read the work in a similar fashion. However, Diamond’s method has its problems: The Mishneh Tora deals with various categories of halachic law, and the unique nature of each must be taken into account when analyzing their contents. The degree to which it is possible to discern Maimonides’ philosophical views in his halachic rulings is unclear. One can argue that on certain weighty issues (questions of personal status, for example), Maimonides’ legal opinion probably reflects his philosophical ideas. On “lighter” issues, however, such as the laws of acquisition, he chooses not to engage in a deep analysis and is satisfied with the reasoning presented in the Talmud, though it may not be compatible with his philosophy. As Yohanan Twersky wrote in his introduction to the Mishneh Tora:
One must act with caution in evaluating the influence of personal or philosophical opinion over halachic rulings or interpretation.… It is unnecessary to presuppose a purely philosophical motivation behind each ruling, particularly if it already has an explanation based on logic or rabbinic precedent.
Furthermore, any sweeping philosophical reading of the Mishneh Tora must consider Maimonides’ distinction—elucidated in the Guide—between “essential belief” and “true belief”:
Sum up what we have said concerning beliefs as follows: In some cases a commandment communicates a correct belief, which is the one and only thing aimed at—as, for instance, the belief in the unity and eternity of the deity and in his not being a body. In other cases the belief is necessary for the abolition of reciprocal wrongdoing or for the acquisition of a noble moral quality—as, for instance, the belief that he, may he be exalted, has a violent anger against those who do injustice... and as the belief that he... responds instantaneously to the prayer of someone wronged or deceived.
An “essential belief,” according to Maimonides, may not be “true,” but it is necessary to ensure social stability. From this, it is possible to conclude that at least some of the halachic rulings included in the Mishneh Tora were set down with this rationale in mind and are not intended to convey any deep philosophical convictions.
Equally problematic is the treatment of the Mishneh Tora and the Guide of the Perplexed as if they were a single text. In fact, they were composed with two very different audiences in mind. The Mishneh Tora was intended to replace the Talmud as the practical legal code of the Jewish people, and thus to be accessible to all. The Guide was composed for a reader of another type: “the perplexed” of the book’s title. These were students and scholars who had studied philosophy and the sciences in addition to religious learning and were wrestling with the contradiction—or in Maimonides’ view, the supposed contradiction—between the Bible and the edicts of rationalism. Although both works appear to possess an esoteric meaning, the distinction between their intended readerships certainly influenced their style of writing and the content their author wished to convey.
At the very least, these difficulties demand some methodological discussion, which Diamond could easily have provided in the preface to his book. In the end, however, this does not detract from the merits of Converts, Heretics, and Lepers. Its author analyzes the notoriously difficult Maimonidean texts with surgical precision. His iconoclastic and original interpretations make for fascinating reading and help to deepen our understanding of Maimonides’ thought, the enormous intellectual riches of which have yet to be exhausted.
Orly Roth is a lecturer in Jewish philosophy.
