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PDF FormatIn other words, the aim of the Tora is to answer the question, “Who is man?” Not man as substance or as an object for the discernment of his properties. We are not looking to answer the question, “What is man?” but rather “Who is man?”—as a subject and a person. The immediate implication of this way of defining the question is that the Tora addresses itself to both man’s will and his thoughts.15 Its content presents itself immediately and imperceptibly as both knowledge and norm, because in the answer to the question, “Who is man?” it is impossible to distinguish between what is and what ought to be. The ideal and the future, the project of realizing and being that one has to undertake, are as much a part of the definition of man as are his past and his identity as presently constituted. One cannot be satisfied here with “I think, therefore I am” or “I am, I exist”; for I do not yet exist.
But each of the “outer sciences” investigates a particular field of content, one aspect of reality, aiming to answer the questions, “What is there?” and “What is it?” No longer the question “Who” but the question “What.” Whether we are talking about natural sciences such as physics or biology, the social sciences, or even the sciences of the mind such as psychology or psychoanalysis, each one, with its own approach and in its own field, seeks to describe and understand a particular aspect of objective reality. They are unable to contemplate man as man, as a person, as a moral being in the broadest understanding of the term. This field transcends all the others, even those to which it is most directly linked, such as politics, economics, or sexuality.
An example will help us draw this distinction more clearly. As is well known, one of the Ten Commandments received at Sinai is the prohibition against murder (lo tirtzah). The need for such a prohibition is self-evident. A society which permitted murder could not survive, the latter’s legalization being perfectly incompatible with any political life or economic order. But is that the essential meaning of this prohibition? We could easily be convinced that we are talking here about considerations that are solely practical, almost technical, in nature, which would not justify the presence of this prohibition in the context of revelation. Its real foundation, however, lies in man’s own humanity, which carries the implication of recognition and respect of the other man as such, and therefore above all the recognition of the value of his life and his uniqueness. And here lies the revelation within the prohibition. Each commandment, whether prohibition or positive obligation, possesses this dual nature to one degree or another—necessary or desirable because of pragmatic considerations on the one hand, yet built on some aspect of the humanity of man, on the other.
It goes without saying that things are rarely quite as simple as I have just made them out to be. Certainly one should not lie. But should one accord this rule a universal extension, as Kant seems to say? Can’t one lie in some cases, out of modesty or a sense of decency, or in order to avoid hurting someone or to make peace between brothers who have become enemies? We therefore need a science of the permitted lie. More generally, each person finds himself positioned amid a network of relationships and loyalties—to spouse, family, city, people, humanity, and even the animal, vegetable, or mineral worlds. For man as man, the multiplicity of these positions has as its corollary a multiplicity of responsibilities. How may they be reconciled, how far do they go, and what are their limits and interactions? The science of man as such—the “science of Who”—also may be called the science of responsibilities. Man also has a history, and this is especially true of the Jew for whom history tends paradoxically to be immemorial. What aspects of it must one take for granted, commemorate, or relive?16 What remains of it, what duties flow from it, how has it been distorted? It is not the role of the historian to produce such a normative science of history, no matter how accurate the accounts he provides.
These considerations, partial and provisional as they may be, open up a huge field of inquiry. One cannot answer these questions just by spelling out a few generous and general principles. The variegation and intricacy of the problems at hand push us to the point of vertigo, and no individual effort could articulate them all, much less solve them. This work can only be done by a collectivity, one thoroughly dedicated to the task, which would inherit conclusions from the past, develop them, and pass on new results to subsequent generations. One can recognize here the constitutive process of all science. Within the multiplicity of the “outer sciences,” the distinguishing feature of the Tora does not reside in formal qualities but within the tradition’s own understanding of its content. According to the formula of Leon Ashkenazi, who made it central to his teachings, the Tora is sefer toledot adam, the book of the annals of man.17 This is what I have tried to express by the title of this study: Tora is the “science of Who,” the other sciences are the “sciences of What.”18
This having been established, an important question arises: Is knowledge of the “outer sciences” useful, even necessary, for the deepening of the Tora itself? This question has two sides to it, one technical or pedagogical, the other theoretical.
From the technical or pedagogical point of view, there is no doubt what the answer should be. As numerous authors have noted, in particular Judah Halevi, the calendar of holidays, the laws of family purity, and those of slaughtering animals for food, all require a broad knowledge of astronomy, anatomy, or medicine to be understood. There is practically no area of the law which is independent of the experience of the real world. Moreover, the utility of a general education for the development of the spirit has scarcely been contested. It was mainly during and after the historical circumstances surrounding the advent of the Emancipation, in the face of an extraordinary threat of assimilation, that a powerful distrust of general knowledge sometimes emerged. But this phenomenon was mainly of a marginal, contingent character.
On the other hand, the theoretical aspect of the question is more delicate and has been the object of controversy. Is knowledge of the “outer sciences” necessary for a good understanding of Tora from a metaphysical standpoint? One cannot say there is a consensus on this question. It seems to me nonetheless, when push comes to shove, that once all the circumstantial fears have been eliminated, one must answer this question in the affirmative. At any rate, this is how Maimonides expressed it:
You, however, know how all these subjects [heaven, angels, world, soul] are connected together; for there is nothing else in existence but God and his works, the latter including all existing things besides him; we can only obtain a knowledge of him through his works; his works give evidence of his existence, and show what must be assumed concerning him, that is to say, what must be attributed to him either affirmatively or negatively. It is thus necessary to examine all things according to their essence, to infer from every species such true and well-established propositions as may assist us in the solution of metaphysical problems.
Again, many propositions based on the nature of numbers and the properties of geometrical figures, are useful in examining things which must be negatived in reference to God, and these negations will lead us to further inferences. You will certainly not doubt the necessity of studying astronomy and physics, if you are desirous of comprehending the relation between the world and Providence as it is in reality, and not according to imagination. There are also many subjects of speculation, which, though not preparing the way for metaphysics, help to train the reasoning power, enabling it to understand the nature of a proof, and to test truth by characteristics essential to it.... Consequently he who wishes to attain to human perfection, must therefore first study Logic, next the various branches of Mathematics in their proper order, then Physics, and lastly Metaphysics.19
Closer to our own time, the Vilna Gaon encouraged one of his students, Rabbi Baruch, to translate Euclid’s books of geometry into Hebrew. This student related the following in the name of the Vilna Gaon:
To each deficiency in the knowledge of the other sciences corresponds a hundredfold [deficiency] in the knowledge of the Tora, since the Tora and science are linked together.20
One should not go overboard in drawing conclusions from such a sentence. It is precisely the uncertainty that surrounds it that is significant. The fact that it is only related in the name of, and not written by, the Vilna Gaon; and conversely, the fact that later it was accepted as authentic, and that notably Rabbi Kook drew certain inferences from this one sentence, shows us both the importance and the danger of what it suggests.
There is in this sentence the affirmation of the ultimate unity of knowledge. Tora and science are two distinct but indivisible manifestations of a single truth. The risks inherent in such a conception are clear; it could indeed lead to a simplistic reduction, to the confusion of Tora with a medical textbook, removing from it its dimension of inwardness and transcendence to recast it as a kind of scientism, where Tora ceases to be the “science of Who” and becomes yet another “science of What” among many. The unity of science and Tora that is postulated here is not the unity of a blend or the unity of a synthesis. It is, in a way, a unity by correspondence, the unity which links the internal face to the external face of a single vessel.
Final question: During the last two centuries, science has developed on an unprecedented scale. This development has entailed a change of approach or attitude with regard to numerous problems. As a consequence of this evolution, should we anticipate a deepening of the tradition? Here is, in any event, the opinion of Rabbi Kook:
Gradually, as scientific research finds precise laws amid the chaos of phenomena... the science of “the work of the creation” is increasingly exposed and explained in public, nourishing numerous spirits.... In parallel, higher truths that have always constituted the strength of the Sages and illuminated Israel as a whole... come progressively within reach of everybody. From now on it is going to be impossible to explain even simple notions of faith to average people without recourse to the most hidden notions, which stand at the top of the world.21
Thus, with the advance of science, there have increased both the insistence and the ability of the human spirit to receive truths once considered too subtle to be understood. These new exigencies do not necessitate a reconsideration of traditional truths, nor even a conflict with them. They do imply, however, an effort of purification of their formulation, the elimination of confused or erroneous representations which were introduced in the shadow of external influences. Furthermore, the categories and the formulae of Scholastic theology of the Middle Ages, at least taken in their literal sense, are no longer sufficient to explain the fundamental doctrines of Judaism.
What new paths may be explored? How is it possible, from an immense treasure of texts, laws, and traditions, to fashion new syntheses? Perhaps we are required, as Rabbi Kook puts it, to call upon “notions which stand on top of the world”—an expression which he consistently used when referring to the teachings of the Kabbala.
The attitude of Jewish tradition towards science can therefore be summarized as a conditional acquiescence: Acquiescence to the claim of science to be an authentic vision of reality, acquiescence to its important place in the theoretical order as objective and true thought. But this acquiescence is still conditional, and it comes with a few restrictions: Rejection of sorcery of any kind; rejection of alienation of man by ideology; and finally the limitation of the sciences to their proper place, meaning to the periphery of truth. The “sciences of What” cannot replace the “science of Who.” The center of truth remains the Tora, sefer toledot adam, the book of the annals of man.
Georges Hansel is a professor at the University of Rouen. A French version of this essay was originally published in Explorations Talmudiques (Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 1998).
Notes
1. Rabbi Joseph Karo, Shulhan Aruch, Orah Haim, 224:6.
2. Isaiah 5:12; Shabbat 75a.
3. Isaiah 5:11-12.
4. Deuteronomy 4:6.
5. Shabbat 75a.
6. Deuteronomy 4:5-6.
7. Maimonides, Mishneh Tora, Laws of Sanctifying the New Moon 17:24.
8. Rashi: Acronym of Rabbi Shlomo Yitzhaki, eminent commentator of the Bible and the Talmud, born in Troyes in 1040. It is practically impossible to read the Talmud without referring to his commentary.
9. Deuteronomy 18:9.
10. Therefore, since Rav forbids “learning” from a magush, this cannot be applied to a sorcerer and therefore, he is the one for whom magush means blasphemer. Shabbat 75a.
11. For a more thorough discussion of this point, see “Esthetic and Idolatry,” in Georges Hansel, Explorations Talmudiques (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1998).
12. Rashi’s commentary on Shabbat 75a.
13. Judah Halevi, The Kuzari: An Argument for the Faith of Israel, trans. Hartwig Hirschfeld (London: G. Routledge & Sons, 1906).
14. Mishna Avot 3:18. The translation of the word gematriot as geometry was given by the Maharal of Prague in his book Derech Haim; the lines that follow are in large part inspired by his comments.
15. This idea is developed by Rabbi Kook in his book The Lights of Holiness (Orot HaKodesh) (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1985). [Hebrew]
16. “In each generation, everybody must consider that he himself has come out of Egypt.” Pesahim 116b.
17. See also Nahmanides, Commentary on the Tora, Genesis 5:1-2.
18. The centrality given to Tora and man should, of course, not be confused with an anthropocentrism relating to the physical world. The earth indeed revolves around the sun, but, as one midrashic text has it, the fact that there is nothing new “under the sun” does not mean there is nothing at all “above the sun.”
19. Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed, trans. M. Friedländer (New York: Dover, 1956), part 1, ch. 34, pp. 45-46.
20. Rabbi Baruch of Shklov, “Introduction,” in Euclid’s Book, trans. Rabbi Baruch of Shklov (The Hague: Leyb Zusmansh, 1780).
21. Kook, The Lights of Holiness, Hochmat Hakodesh, vol. 1, section 6.
